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ABSTRACT
Martinez, Jennifer Dawn. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2014.
The Institution of Green: The Interaction of Green Strategies and Key Stakeholders. CoMajor Professors: Dr. Marla Royne Stafford and Dr. George Deitz.
By empirically connecting the legitimization process with individual stakeholder
groups, this research enhances our understanding of the impact of the institutional
environment on organizational efforts toward sustainability, and suggests a new approach
to examining the influence of stakeholders on green strategies.
This dissertation consists of two papers. In the first paper, the role of consumers and
the process of legitimazation of the green organization is examined. Hypotheses are
testing experimentally, wherein subjects consider a range of green organizational
behaviors. Analysis reveals that all green behaviors result in the organization earning
some legitimacy. Further, there is no significant difference in consumers' attitudes
toward the company that practices substantive, symbolic, or no green behaviors, as
hypothesized. Finally, seemingly important moderating relationships, such as skepticism
toward environmental claims and prior environmental concern, do not impact legitimacy
or attitude toward the company.
The second paper examines the role of the shareholder. This research introduces
the idea of coercive pressure placed on the organization to be green, and the resulting
organizational legitimacy of the firm is examined. Hypotheses are tested through event
study methodology. The event examined is the announcement of a supplier sustainability
scorecard mandate by publically traded firms. Analysis reveals that shareholders of the
supplier firms view the mandate positively, with moderating effects from the level of
environmental transparency and degree of financial leverage of the supplier firms.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

1

Introduction and Purpose of the Research

1

2

Literature Review

4

3

Paper 1: The Legitimacy of an Organization’s
Environmental Sustainability

35

4

Paper 2: Shareholder Reactions to Implementation of a
Supplier Sustainability Scorecard

67

5

Conclusions

104

References

110

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1

Summary of Stakeholder Salience

10

2

Summary of Measurement Instrument

50

3

Measurement Model Fit Statistics

51

4

Measurement Model Loadings

52

5

Discriminant Validity of Model Constructs

53

6

Summary of Results of Hypothesis Testing

57

7

Event Study Outcome

91

8

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

94

9

Announcement Effect on Stock Price

95

10

Estimation Results for Scorecard Mandate

98

11

Summary of Results of Hypothesis Testing

100

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
Everyone is going green! Marketers and managers increasingly realize the
importance of greening their company in response to demands for environmentally
sustainable processes and products. We are, in essence, in the midst of large-scale
changes in institutions across the board, where firms want to be known for being
environmentally conscious. The demand for greener institutions, and the response by
companies to this demand, are the topics of much research in recent years because
academics and practitioners want to know what works, why, how, and under what
conditions. Furthermore, it is important to understand not only how organizational
behaviors affect stakeholders, but also how stakeholders influence organizational
behaviors. Because of the complexity and dynamism of the relationships between
companies and numerous stakeholders to those companies (Katz & Kahn, 1978), research
in this area is challenging, and our knowledge of the mechanisms behind institutional
change toward being environmentally sustainable remains elusive.
The study of institutions is the study of norm-governed behavior (Holm, 1995), and
Institutional Theory (IT) states that societal rules, norms and expectations emerge
through a distinct process including 1) occurrence of significant events (e.g., water
shortages, recognition of ozone-depleting products); 2) awareness and knowledge
dissemination surrounding the ultimate effect of those events (e.g., literary works,
articles); 3) growing momentum to address the issue (e.g., Earth Day), and 4) eventually
a general convergence of beliefs around how people and organizations should act
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regarding the issue. This convergence of beliefs is at the root of the demand made on
organizations to be green.
Over the past few decades, we have seen a shift in thinking by individuals and
companies toward normative environmental consciousness. In other words, the concept
of environmental consciousness is becoming commonplace and perhaps eventually,
taken-for-granted. Reaching a level where a practice or belief is taken for granted is a
pinnacle of institutionalism. Therefore, this research, building on IT, considers how
organizations go green given their current institutional environments.
The purpose of this research is to enhance theoretical and empirical knowledge as to
how green organizational behaviors are perceived by two key stakeholder groups,
consumers and shareholders, and how those stakeholders’ perceptions may or may not
validate the firms’ green actions. This research contributes to existing marketing
knowledge about institutional change toward organizational greenness through two
pioneering studies that examine consumers’ and shareholders’ reactions to green
strategies. Academic literature has explored the concept of organizational greenness, but
has not yet fully applied a theoretical basis to how firms change to become green
institutions.
In response to multiple pleas for such research grounded in theory (e.g., Carraher,
Buckley, & Carraher, 2008; Connelly, Ketchen, & Slater, 2011; MSI, 2010; Webster,
2009), this research first conceptualizes stakeholders; second, the study highlights recent
literature surrounding stakeholders and green organizations; third, the literature on
environmental consciousness is discussed to explain the criticality of organizations’
attending to the natural environment as well as the opportunity born from marketing a
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green organization; fourth, institutional theory, as well as institutional change and
institutional legitimacy and other important constructs, will be introduced and developed
in Chapter 2 to create the framework for this research.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into five chapters:
Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose of the Research
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Chapter 3: Paper 1: “The Legitimacy of an Organization’s Environmental Sustainability”
Chapter 4: Paper 2: “Shareholder Reactions to Implementation of a Supplier
Sustainability Scorecard”
Chapter 5: Conclusion
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Today, half the American population can name a product that they’ve chosen or
dropped as a result of learning more about a company’s environmental record (Shelton,
2012). Incredibly, this represents a 30% increase from 2008. Therefore, it is no surprise
that more than 65% of executives consider sustainability as a revenue driver, and more
than half of those executives consider their green efforts to be a distinct competitive
advantage (Makower, 2009, 2012). This dissertation is inspired by the desire to better
understand how organizations respond to the call to be environmentally conscious, and
the intriguing question of whether intensive change is required or if the organization
benefits from lesser efforts to be green.
Not all organizations truly adopt a green orientation. Some companies experience
new life breathed into products that have declined in popularity over the years merely by
giving the impression of being environmentally conscious. For example, Clorox was
ready to sell its Brita water filtration division in 2007 when sales of its pitcher filtration
system lost market share. By touting Brita’s “green attributes” and the environmental
benefits of using its water filtration system (by reducing the waste from individual bottles
of water), the company seized the opportunity to sell “greener alternatives” as its
marketing strategy. In this example, the company and the product remained unchanged
but the marketing message became focused on sustainability. Clorox was not claiming to
be a truly green company. Rather, Clorox successfully signaled an environmentally
sustainable orientation not by creating a green product or changing its practices toward
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sustainability, but instead by using a green strategy. This strategy saved Brita’s water
filtration division.
In contrast, wildly successful Starbucks Coffee Company takes a comprehensive
approach to its environmental consciousness by recycling, reducing waste, building
energy efficient stores, conserving water, and offering incentives to employees who also
act responsibly regarding the environment, just to name a few of Starbucks’ green efforts.
These two companies practice very different green behaviors, and it has yet to be
discovered whether or not stakeholders have different perceptions of each firm based on
these distinct efforts.
In recent years, the practice of green marketing has become highly accepted and
applied in virtually every area of marketing (Chen, 2010), from product development and
service processes, to end-of-life product alternatives (i.e., recycling). However,
companies are often unsure whether or not successes and failures are directly attributable
to their green marketing efforts and how those efforts affect the bottom line. Academic
research continues to produce conflicting findings, thus confusing practitioners since
organizations practice a broad spectrum of environmental consciousness.
On one hand, research shows that consumers react more favorably toward
environmentally conscious companies (Bremmer, 1989; Chase, 1991; Kirkpatrick, 1990;
Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Weber, 1990), even showing increased patronage of green
firms (Menon & Menon, 1997). Additionally, Azzone and Bertele (1994) find that
shareholders may limit investments to firms that focus on environmental issues.
Regarding employees, Ottman (1993) suggests that organizational greening leads to
enhanced employee morale. Further confusing practitioners are findings that the majority
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of consumers are skeptical about companies’ environmental claims in the first place
(Leonidou & Leonidou, 2012; Ramirez, 2013; Stokes & Turri, 2013).
Stakeholders and Stakeholder Theory
A stakeholder is generally defined as “any group or individual who is affected by or
can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984). Examples
of stakeholders are firms’ customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers, government,
and society in general (Freeman, 1984). The relationship between the organization and
stakeholder is reciprocal in the sense that the actions of the firm affect the welfare of its
stakeholders, while the firm is also impacted by stakeholder demands (Evan & Freeman,
1988). In 2013, the American Marketing Association approved a revision to the
definition of marketing, which now states “marketing is the activity, set of institutions,
and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that
have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large.”
This revised definition of marketing not only emphasizes the importance of value
creation, but it also specifies multiple stakeholders (beyond the consumer) as the
recipients of such value. This concern for multiple stakeholders is prevalent in academic
research, and a stakeholder approach continues to be the predominant foundation for
marketing analysis.
Researchers consider a stakeholder approach to organizational research superior to
an economic approach (Freeman, 1984; Maignan, Ferrell, & Ferrell, 2005; Polonsky,
1995), since attitudes have shifted from one where the firm exists solely to make a profit
and satisfy investors and shareholders, to one that emphasizes that firms have the “never
ending task of balancing and integrating multiple relationships and multiple objectives”
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(Freeman & McVea, 2001). Greenley, Hooley, Broderick, and Rudd (2004), among
others, support the idea that firms have a need to take a stakeholder approach to
marketing by understanding and addressing all stakeholder needs and demands, and that
strategic planning must go beyond focusing on consumers over all others (Ferrell, 2004).
Stakeholders are increasingly concerned not only with survival of the firm, but also
with organizational performance including economic prosperity (i.e., profits),
environmental quality (i.e., the planet), and social justice (i.e., people) (Elkington, 1997),
a concept coined as the “triple-bottom line.” Stakeholder theory broadly incorporates the
principle that firms must consider all of its stakeholders. Additionally, organizations are
under immense pressure to develop initiatives that balance stakeholder interests.
Scholars and practitioners now know that companies that take a balanced stakeholder
approach (e.g., green marketing, employee opportunity programs, pro-social behaviors)
have better communication and relationships with the respective stakeholder groups, and
thus experience enhanced corporate identity (Bromley, 2001; Dowling, 2003; Maignan et
al. 2005).
Firms realize the advantages of adhering to a triple-bottom line approach to
environmentally conscious marketing strategies (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006) and, thus,
going green is taking center stage. While the cost of going green can be significant,
green strategies are linked to greater competitiveness, innovation, and enhanced financial
performance (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999;
Majumdar & Marcus, 2001).
Research has considered stakeholders from several standpoints, including how a
firm’s focus will affect relationships with stakeholders (Greenley & Foxall, 1996),
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whether stakeholders are internal or external to the firm (Miller & Lewis, 1991), how
stakeholders can directly or indirectly affect, and/or be affected by organizational
behavior in general (Freeman, 1984), and whether stakeholders are considered primary or
secondary to the firm (Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002) to understand what occurs at
the marketing level. However, little attention has been paid to the processes underlying
the organizational change toward sustainability and the resulting impact to the firm.
Consideration of the way in which firms approach stakeholders in the process of
greening an organization requires a more closely defined view of stakeholders. A broad
view of stakeholders includes everyone or any group who might have a claim to or stake
in the company. This perspective is all-encompassing, and firms cannot possibly
consider all stakeholders in every circumstance (e.g., Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997).
Narrower views of stakeholders consider the practical reality that resources are limited,
and with limited resources managers direct their attention to those stakeholders who are
most relevant under the given situation (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995;
Freeman & Reed, 1983).
In singling out stakeholders who are the most critical to a firm, managers seek a
common denominator as a basis for choosing the most relevant stakeholders. Mitchell et
al. (1997) succinctly organized the literature and created a typology of stakeholders to
define a stakeholder’s saliency to the firm and management. This typology includes three
elements, and each stakeholder possesses one, two, or all three of these elements. The
more elements a stakeholder has, the more salient or important that stakeholder is to the
firm.
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The elements in the typology put forth by Mitchell et al. (1997) are power,
legitimacy, and urgency. Power is defined as “the ability to bring about the outcomes
one desires” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 3). Legitimacy in this sense refers to the
genuineness of ones’ claim against or stake in an organization. A legitimate claim or
stake is defined as one who is at risk of losing something, or who has property rights to
the organization, or who has a moral claim against the organization (Mitchell et al.,
1997). Although this definition is imprecise because a stakeholder may consider a claim
legitimate when a manager does not, or vice versa, this definition of legitimacy is useful
in identifying stakeholders in conjunction with the other two elements. Finally, urgency
comes into play in stakeholder-manager relationships, and exists when two conditions are
met: (1) time sensitivity – the degree to which inattention to a claim is unacceptable to
the stakeholder, and (2) criticality – the importance of the claim or relationship to the
stakeholder (Jones, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1997).
Further development of stakeholder theory concludes that firms must closely define
what they stand for and, no matter what type of business firms conduct, firms must take
into account the effects of their behaviors on others (e.g., Freeman, 2004; Freeman &
McVea, 2001). Furthermore, multiple stakeholders’ interests are often in conflict with
one another, and must be balanced over time (Greenley et al., 2004). To conserve
resources and minimize the cost to the firm of attending to multiple stakeholder needs,
the firm must create a prioritization of stakeholders, in general.
Stakeholder salience has also been explained as the amount of knowledge
stakeholders have about the firm (Freudenberg, 1999), whereas Savage (1991) considered
the ability of a stakeholder to cooperate with or pose a threat the firm as critical
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characteristics to consider. Johnson and Scholes (2002) ranked stakeholder priority in
terms of their influencing power. All of the studies contain important considerations, but
the stakeholder groups in this dissertation (consumers and shareholders) would share
most, if not all, of the common elements in many of the existing important research
findings.
Stakeholder prioritization has been a topic of much research, and while academics
have defined stakeholder salience in slightly different ways, the consensus is that
attending to multiple stakeholders is essential (Freeman, 2004; Freeman & McVea, 2001;
Greenley et al., 2004; Maignan et al., 2005). Figure 1 depicts the Mitchell et al. (1997)
typology of stakeholders, and Table 1 summarizes each of the stakeholder types for this
research. This research does not explicate the intricacies of individual stakeholder
groups, but instead broadly considers two of the most vital stakeholder groups
(consumers and shareholders) based on stakeholder salience described by Mitchell et al.
(1997).

Figure 1. Stakeholder Salience
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Table 1
Summary of Stakeholder Salience
Stakeholder Type Element(s) Level of
Included
Salience
1. Dormant
1
Low

Example

2. Discretionary

2

Low

3. Demanding
4. Dominant

3
1, 2

Low
Moderate

5. Dangerous

1, 3

Moderate

6. Dependent

2, 3

Moderate

7. Definitive

1, 2, 3

High

8. Nonstakeholder

None

None

Those who can
command media
attention
Those who receive
donations or volunteer
labor
Lone picketers
Employees,
consumers,
shareholders
Disgruntled/fired
employees
The natural
environment
Any Dominant
Stakeholder who
acquires the missing
attribute
N/A

This dissertation takes the essential next step to establish a framework necessary
to explore the process by which firms go green through assuming a multiple stakeholder,
triple-bottom line approach. Specifically, the research questions include: How do firms
change from a pre-green institution to a green institution through appealing to important
stakeholders in ways that attend to the people-planet-profit mindset? What are the
resulting stakeholder perceptions of the changing organization from a pre-green
institution to a green institution? What role do stakeholder perceptions play in earning
legitimacy as a green organization?
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Sustainability
According to the Center for Sustainable Enterprise (2010), sustainability is
conceptualized as “a way of doing business that creates profit while avoiding harm to
people and the planet.” Over the past decade, academics and practitioners within the
marketing discipline have witnessed a dramatic shift in thinking about sustainability, and
few topics have garnered such attention as the greening of business. We have seen
consumer perspectives shift from extreme skepticism to commoditization of green
products in many categories (Ottman, 2011). Furthermore, some of the worst companies
for environmental pollution are changing practices to be more environmentally sensitive.
This dynamism presents ample opportunity for important research in sustainability.
Peter Drucker was among the pioneers in bringing sustainability within the domain
of marketing (Connelly et al. 2011; Drucker, 1994). Drucker promoted the idea that
marketers and management must accept moral and social responsibility as a foundation
for doing business (Webster, 2009). Furthermore, Drucker emphasized that marketers
and managers would soon face new opportunities to embrace sustainability, and would
likewise face pressure to become a sustainable enterprise (Drucker, 1994).
Sustainability research in a marketing context refers to those marketing practices,
procedures, and policies that explicate how concern for the natural environment can help
achieve organizational and individual objectives for a product or line (Menon, Menon,
Chowdhury, & Jankovich, 1999). Further developing the concepts of sustainability,
Menon and Menon (1997) suggest that organizations could take advantage of
opportunities to demonstrate social and moral leadership through reducing environmental
problems (e.g., reducing waste in production). Apparently, marketing managers are
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paying attention, because firms have acknowledged positive gains as a result of
environmentally friendly marketing strategies (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Orsato, 2006).
As evidence that firms are actually facing pressure to be more environmentally focused,
firms that ignore this call receive negative backlash from consumers in the way of
boycotts as well as scrutiny from other organizations (Guitierrez, 2010; Kleindorfer,
Singhal & Wassenhove, 2005).
Although there are volumes of articles on the topic in marketing, existing
sustainability research generally addresses one (or more) of five general issues. First are
the antecedents to sustainability. Specifically, research considers what external elements
may influence a firm to be green, such as consumers (e.g., Menguc, Auh, & Ozanne,
2010); regulations (e.g., Menon et al., 1999); media forces (e.g., Henriques & Sadorsky,
1999); and industry type (e.g., Banerjee, Iyer, & Kashyap, 2003). Further, marketing
research considers which internal elements may influence a firm to be green, such as top
management type (e.g., Banerjee, 2001), resources of the firm (e.g., Surroca, Tribo, &
Waddock, 2010), and organizational structure (e.g., Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012).
Second, sustainability research in marketing has focused on how organizations
actually practice sustainability. For example, Bansal (2003) discussed how the issue of
sustainability permeates different levels of the firm. Additionally, leadership style and
management attitude around sustainability, in general, are known to affect how
organizations practice environmental concern (e.g., Egri & Herman, 2000). Further, the
adoption of certifications such as ISO 14000 has also been a topic of much research in
marketing, management, and other disciplines (e.g., Schaefer, 2007).
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A third issue in marketing research encompasses various measures of firm
performance as it relates to sustainability. These measures include shareholder
investment (e.g., Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009); market (e.g., Miles & Covin, 2000);
financial (e.g., Menguc et al., 2010); operations (e.g., Klassen & Whybark, 1999); and of
course customer feedback (e.g., Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). While this may be the
single largest topic area in sustainability research in marketing, the findings are often
inconsistent and inconclusive (Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Cronin, Smith, Ramirez, Gleim,
& Martinez, 2011).
Fourth, research surrounding sustainability as it relates to specific aspects of the
marketing mix includes market orientation of the firm (e.g., Crittenden, Crittenden,
Ferrell, Ferrell, & Pinney, 2011); communication and promotion of green products and
practices (e.g., Banerjee et al., 1995; Maignan & Ferrell, 2004); product design (e.g.,
Pujari, 2006); operations (e.g., Drumwright, 1994; Salam, 2009); and customer attraction
and retention (e.g., Menon at al., 1999). While these studies are compelling, the majority
of the research is conceptual and just begins to scratch the surface in understanding how
organizations adopt sustainability into the marketing mix.
Consumer topics in sustainability are the fifth broad area of existing marketing
research. While consumer topics may be the most researched area in sustainability and
marketing, the research is overwhelmingly conceptual and light on empirical insights that
could be useful in practice. Broadly, research in the consumer arena of sustainability in
marketing include attitudes toward sustainability (e.g., Van Doorn & Verhoef, 2011);
willingness to pay for green products (e.g., Royne, Martinez, Oakley, & Fox, 2012);
consumer perceptions of firm practices (e.g., Becker-Olsen, Taylor, Hill, & Yalcinkaya,
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2011); and consumers’ evaluations of firms’ motivations for sustainability (e.g., Vlachos,
Tsamakos, Vrechopoulos, & Avramidis, 2009).
Sustainability has gained much attention in the marketplace as well as in marketing
literature in recent years, and is often studied with Elkington’s (1997) triple-bottom line
framework discussed earlier. The triple-bottom line framework focuses on the
importance of balancing business with economic prosperity, social equity, and
environmental quality (e.g., Leonidou, Katsikeas, & Morgan, 2012).
Because sustainability is becoming the norm, many firms implement programs in
hope that those efforts result in profits to the organization and benefits to the public and
the environment (Orsato, 2006). While these efforts are successful for some firms, other
firms may fail miserably. The literature on green organizations is extensive; however,
there is little research on the process by which firms earn stakeholders’ approval as an
environmentally sustainable entity. By applying institutional theory this research
provides insight into the role that marketing plays in greening the organization through
consideration of two key stakeholder groups of interest.
Doing business with sustainability in mind is fast becoming an expectation, or an
“institution” in modern culture. Institutions are what guide human behavior (Giddens,
1984; Scott, 2008; Zucker, 1977), and are defined as enduring features of social life
(Giddens, 1984), made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources
(Zucker, 1977). Those symbolic elements are rules, norms and beliefs (Scott, 2008), such
as the institutions of marriage or family.
In summary, applying an institutional explanation to the phenomenon of
organizational greening is an ideal concept for this dissertation. Institutional theory states
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that firms will adopt similar practices because they are driven by institutional pressures
for conformity and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott,
1987), which is exactly what we are experiencing with the high number of organizations
attempting to go green. Further, this research evaluates the credence that organizations
seek by applying what we know about legitimacy within the institutional theory
literature.
Environmental Concern
Environmental Concern (EC) is a concept researched in marketing and consumer
behavior for decades. According to Banerjee and McKeage (1994), the environment
became a critical concern for many following the first observance of Earth Day in 1970,
bringing environmental destruction into the spotlight. Heightened media attention
surrounding air and water pollution, ozone depletion, and other environmental issues led
to increased legislation (Landler, Schiller, & Smart, 1991), creation of new products that
appeal to those with a concern for the environment (Dillingham, 1990), and huge
increases in spending by firms on green advertising (Iyer & Banerjee, 1992).
Over time, research on EC has been measured in terms of socio-demographic
variables and personality indicators, with only limited success and generalization in
targeting consumers according to their pro-environmental behaviors (Schlegelmilch,
Bohlen, & Diamantopoulos, 1996; von Borgstede & Andersson, 2010). An alternative
segmentation approach was considered by Schlegelmilch et al. (1996) since it is likely
that people who exhibit high levels of EC are more generally more supportive of green
organizations, products, and services. This approach included not only an attitude
component (attitude toward the environment, in general), but also a knowledge
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component (individual levels of factual knowledge regarding specific or general
environmental issues). The knowledge element was added to curtail criticism
surrounding the weak attitude-behavior link (Bohlen, Schlegelmilch, & Diamantopoulos,
1993).
Institutions and Institutional Theory
We all live by unwritten rules that emerge as changes in the world occur, such as
modern industrialization. Societies not only help to shape major changes, but they also
adapt to the changes simultaneously by creating frameworks for how people should act
regarding those changes. For example, in the early 1800s mass destruction of ancient
forests in the U.S. caught the attention of naturalists, environmentalists, and writers in the
mid-United States. Very soon, concern grew for the diminishing forests and wild animals
that inhabited the forests. Through the emergence of unwritten rules and societal
expectations, we now actively preserve our national forests. In fact, the societal pressure
eventually led to written laws with known punishment for breaking those laws. We know
that it is unacceptable (and now illegal) to carve ones’ name into an old-growth tree.
Before preservation of the land, tourists were naïve about the impact of their actions and
acted irresponsibly. Our national parks are now institutions in our society, and this has
become common knowledge.
Institutions are “enduring features of social life” (Giddens, 1984), made up of
symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources (Zucker, 1977). Symbolic
elements are rules, norms and beliefs (Scott, 2008). In other words, institutions are the
normative concepts of society such as the institutions of marriage or family. Institutions
guide human behavior. Societies create numerous institutionalized rules under which
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organizations frame their decisions. Those decisions and actions must meet societal rules
and expectations for the firm to be accepted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Process of institutionalization. Institutionalization is a process whereby structured,
but largely unwritten, societal rules, laws, and expectations emerge, and the study of how
those structures affect organizations. Typically, these socially constructed rules emerge
through a distinct process: First, large-scale events take place (e.g., discovery that some
products deplete the ozone layer). Second, awareness of those events and their
implications become widespread (e.g., Rachel Carson’s 1962 book, Silent Spring). Third,
concerns about the effects from past events - and possible future events - grow and give
way to an evolution of perspectives toward a common mindset (e.g., Earth Day). Fourth,
society takes action to develop rules, written or unwritten, which guide our society and
behavior (e.g., regulations, organizations such as the Sierra Club).
Firms attempt to comply with these emerging institutional rules and expectations
through somewhat of a trial-and-error process. Organizational leaders, such as marketing
managers, have an understanding of the expectations and formulate plans as to how the
organization will behave. Through a variety of measures, it is clear that some firms get it
right, and some firms get it wrong. If a firm gets it right, it might experience increased
patronage of green firms (Menon & Menon, 1997), for example. On the other hand, if a
firm gets it wrong, it might find that shareholders limit investments (Hamilton, 1995).
Over time, firms within industries start to become very similar in structure and
practice as the benefit and necessity become apparent. This growing homogeneity of
organizations occurs through three main processes: normative isomorphism (responding
to social pressures such as trade associations and the media); coercive isomorphism
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(responding to regulatory pressures and others on whom the organization is dependent for
resources); and mimetic isomorphism (merely copying other firms in conditions of
uncertainty) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
The mechanisms that lead to homogeneity of organizations are distinct, yet it is
unlikely that only one mechanism is at play at any given time. For example, as the green
movement continues, it is likely that Company X would adopt practices observed in
Company Y simply because Company X is unsure what it should be doing to be green
(mimetic isomorphism). At the same time, Company X may adopt practices that are
dictated by laws or regulations (coercive isomorphism). Further, Company X may even
respond to social pressures to implement a recycling program for its customers, for
example (normative isomorphism).
Clearly, the three mechanisms toward homogeneity overlap and, while it is possible
to operationalize each, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which mechanism is responsible
for the homogeneity effect of organizations within the institutionalization process. The
end goal, however, is clear: organizations adopt institutionalized norms to be seen as
“legitimate” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Parsons, 1960; Scott, 1987; Suchman, 1995;
Weber, 1978).
Legitimacy
What does it mean to really be green? There are nearly as many definitions of being
green as there are organizations. The key is for an organization to be seen as
“legitimately green” to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, skepticism toward the
organization’s green efforts (Gillespie, 2008). In fact, Gillespie (2008) found that 83% of
the consumers claim to think about the level of a company’s green legitimacy when
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shopping. Consequently, reduced skepticism not only enables a firm to compete more
effectively and gain and maintain access to resources, but it also attracts more consumers
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Therefore, gaining green legitimacy is necessary for all firms (Connelly et al.,
2011; Deephouse, 1999; Scott, 1995) that want to reap the potential benefits of being
green in today’s marketplace. Failure to earn legitimacy, especially if the firm claims to
be green, leads to overall decreased support of that firm (Ottman, 1996; Wood, 1991).
According to institutional theory scholars, legitimacy is broadly defined as “a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions” (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is considered a resource (Dowling & Pfeffer,
1975; Suchman, 1995) in the way of reputational capital (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Hart,
1995). Additionally, legitimacy is a state of being granted to an organization by groups
or individuals external to it (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In other words, when a firm
conforms to stakeholders’ institutional expectations, the firm earns legitimacy.
Earning legitimacy affects not only how people act toward an organization, but also
how the organization is perceived. The legitimate firm is seen as more predictable,
trustworthy, and more meaningful (Suchman, 1995). By the same token, a firm that lacks
legitimacy is vulnerable to criticism since they are seen as negligent (Meyer & Rowan,
1991). Legitimacy researchers take two broad perspectives when it comes to earning
legitimacy. Legitimacy is either (1) a consciously and strategically sought resource, or
(2) a less manageable, less controllable, and more elusive construct.
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Those legitimacy scholars in the strategic-legitimacy camp believe that
organizations can extract legitimacy, often competitively, from its relevant stakeholders
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). This view assumes that managers
have a high degree of control over the institutional environment, and that the organization
can direct the process of earning legitimacy through strategic planning. More
specifically, this perspective views legitimization as purposive and calculated (Suchman,
1995).
Alternatively, those institutional researchers (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer
& Rowan, 1991) consider legitimacy not as an end “prize” that is actively and
deliberately sought with some timeline in mind, but instead as a set of established beliefs
and socially defined evaluations that are more subjective and elusive in nature. In this
way, legitimacy and institutionalization are identical (Suchman, 1988).
Because organizations must attend to both strategic challenges and established
societal beliefs, this research views legitimacy from a dual standpoint. In other words,
legitimacy is considered a resource that can be manipulated to some extent, as well as a
more subtle and elusive construct, and obtaining legitimacy may or may not be obtained
through any control of the organization. Organizations are challenged with how to
strategically manage their actions to demonstrate sustainability, while at the same time
managers must deal with existing cultural environments. Therefore, organizations cannot
fully manage legitimacy due to the duality of power over the legitimacy-earning process.
Keeping the duality of power over the legitimacy-earning process in mind, there are
three types of legitimacy an organization can earn: pragmatic legitimacy, moral
legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). All three types of legitimacy
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include a generalized perception that an organization’s activities are desirable, proper,
and appropriate within some socially constructed system or norms. For this research, that
socially constructed system or norm is the idea that organizations should be
environmentally sustainable.
Pragmatic legitimacy. Shareholders are a group of stakeholders that are offered
something of value by the firm (i.e., return on investment) in exchange for initial
investment. The firm, if it continues to provide a monetary return, will benefit from
further shareholder investment, and both parties depend on this self-interest-based
relationship. Pragmatic legitimacy is often referred to as transaction legitimacy since
each party to the relationship expects to receive something of specific value to him/it.
This type of legitimacy is relevant when there are direct exchanges between an
organization and stakeholder.
Stakeholder salience refers to the relative importance of the stakeholder to the
organization. For example, shareholders are a critical audience to an organization since
they have power to affect the organization, shareholders have a (monetary) claim to the
organization, and the ease with which the relationship between shareholders and the
company can change is great, thereby creating the possibility for urgent reaction to
shareholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). By granting pragmatic legitimacy, an organization’s
stakeholders perceive that they will benefit from the organization’s actions (Castello &
Lozano, 2005). Specifically, if shareholders perceive that green activities will directly
result in greater shareholder returns, then that stakeholder group will consider the firm
legitimate. Therefore, organizations must convince these stakeholders that there is an
immediate, monetary benefit inherent in sustainable behaviors.
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Recall that managers sometimes have the opportunity to affect the legitimacyearning process, but the constraints of acting within an already-institutionalized setting
are ever-present. To earn pragmatic legitimacy, the decision is largely in the hands of the
audience (e.g., shareholders), not the organization. This is the institutional influence on
legitimacy described earlier, wherein the organization is forced to function under a set of
preexisting assumptions and expectations (e.g., shareholders have the expectation of high
returns on their money).
Moral legitimacy. Moral legitimacy connotes a positive normative evaluation of
the firm and the firm’s activities (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). A conscious
evaluation, moral legitimacy is linked to an organization’s outputs as well as its
leadership, organizational structure and procedures (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). The
requirements placed on organizations by society to earn moral legitimacy are made
known through “explicit public discussion” (Suchman, 1995, p. 585), which means that
organizations can benefit through actively participating in discussions around consumer
expectations of a green organization. For example, consumer groups may use social
media to voice concerns for a company’s need to reduce materials in their packaging
process. This is a perfect opportunity for that company to “do the right thing” to earn
moral legitimacy as a sustainable organization. Thus, managers may be able to extract
approval from society and, in turn, earn moral legitimacy, through using deliberate and
persuasive strategies to convey an organization’s sustainability.
The theoretical approach to earning moral legitimacy permits the use of strategy
wherein moral legitimacy can be directly influenced by the actions of the firm (Ashforth
and Gibbs, 1990). Moral legitimacy resides in the “organization’s ability to
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instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols to gain societal support”
(Suchman, 1995, p. 572), as opposed to pragmatic legitimacy which is largely not under
the control of the organization as previously explained.
Cognitive legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy means that something is “taken for
granted” and operates mainly at the subconscious level. In other words, one cannot
articulate exactly why an organization is the best in a certain domain; it just “is.”
Cognitive legitimacy exists when there is little question in the minds of the different
actors that the organization serves as a natural means to effect some state of being
(Hannan & Carroll, 1992). The nature of cognitive legitimacy being abstract makes it
difficult for managers to directly and strategically influence or manipulate perceptions
and earn cognitive legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). However, this form of
legitimacy may disappear if an organization’s practices become seen as unacceptable
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Therefore, cognitive legitimacy may be difficult to attain
intentionally, but certainly maintaining that legitimacy is within the realm of
organizational control.
Building upon the types of legitimacy that organizations seek, the mechanisms
through which legitimacy is conferred depend upon the institutional environment
surrounding that firm. For example, firms in highly regulated industries (e.g., auto
manufacturing) must comply with laws, certifications, and governmental bureaucracy, in
addition to certain societal expectations. The firm’s ability to garner legitimacy from one
stakeholder group is, therefore, dependent upon how the firm must respond to other
stakeholder groups.
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Scott (1995) delineates the types of institutional pressures as regulative, normative,
and cognitive. These are the three “pillars” of institutions. First, Scott (1995) describes
the “regulative” pillar as one that focuses on formal rule systems and enforcement
mechanisms, such as federal laws. Second, the normative pillar includes sets of
expectations, within particular organizational contexts, of what constitutes appropriate
and legitimate behavior. Finally, the cognitive pillar is one that grows out of the
normative and regulative pillars. In other words, when an organization does what is
expected, the organization goes without scrutiny or question. Further, an alternative
structure or alternative behaviors become unthinkable as current, acceptable behaviors
become taken-for-granted (Zucker, 1983). Therefore, the third pillar is cognitive in
nature because the organization exists in the institutional environment often without
much conscious thought (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999;
Zucker, 1983).
Environmental legitimacy is defined as conformity by firms to stakeholders’
environmental conduct expectations (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Hart, 1995) and “a way of
doing business that creates profit while avoiding harm to people and the planet” (The
Center for Sustainable Enterprise, 2010). Earning this legitimacy is difficult or
impossible when a firm’s environmental performance is poor (Wood, 1991), and
stakeholders refuse to place confidence in that firm’s claims of being green. The World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) provides the most widely
accepted definition of an environmentally sustainable organization: “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987).
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Legitimacy and Stakeholders
This dissertation is concerned with the greening of organizations. At the core of this
research lies the question what role do stakeholder perceptions and expectations play in
earning green legitimacy? According to Carroll (1979), organizations have four main
responsibilities (1) economic, (2) legal, (3) ethical, and (4) discretionary. Economic
responsibilities refer to a firm’s maintaining economic growth and consumption needs.
Legal refers to fulfilling a firm’s economic responsibilities while abiding by laws and
regulations. Ethical responsibilities refer to firms’ adhering to social moral rules and
expectations. And finally, discretionary responsibilities are other, non-essential activities
that are expected by society but not mandated, required by law, or ethically required of
business (Carroll, 1979, p. 500).
Taking one stakeholder group at a time, it stands to reason that the process of
earning legitimacy differs depending on the firm-stakeholder relationship as well as the
institutional environment of the firm. For example, while the end goal is to be seen as a
legitimately green organization, the relationship between the firm and its shareholders
(owners) is primarily economic in nature (e.g., shareholders expect a return on their
investment). From shareholders’ perspectives, firms’ activities are seen through a selfinterest lens. This is not to say that shareholders do not care about such things as the
environment. To the contrary, investors are increasingly more concerned with the
“discretionary” actions of the organization.
A conceptual model (Figure 2) helps in understanding the interplay between the
stakeholder-firm relationship, the institutional environment in which the firm must act,
stakeholder evaluation of firm activities, and the resulting legitimacy following
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evaluation of firm activities. Although the institutional environment in which the firm
operates varies depending on the stakeholder group of interest, overlap of environments
means that evaluations may vary as well. For example, although shareholders are
primarily economically motivated, they may have concern for how firms address
sustainability. Therefore, there is an overlap in the institutional environments of the
investor that the firm can utilize since the shareholder will evaluate the firm not only
from an economic standpoint, but also from an ethical standpoint (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Institutional Environments and Legitimacy

Despite the trend toward investors being more socially, ethically, or
environmentally-oriented, the primary goal for investors is return on their investment,
and the larger, the better. This is the institutional environment in which the firm must
operate when dealing with shareholders. Specifically, the idea that shareholders expect a
return on their money is an expectation for organizations. To be seen as legitimate, firms
must deliver returns on investors’ money. Therefore, organizational activities, including
sustainability behaviors, will be scrutinized by shareholders first from an economic
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standpoint, and second from a moral or ethical standpoint. In other words, in an effort to
be green, there is little, if any overlap between the institutional environment of the firmshareholder relationship and the evaluative process toward green legitimacy.
Pressures on organizations to be green are largely socially motivated. In other
words, consumer groups and activists are a driving force behind the institutionalization of
sustainability. For example, in 2006 customers of Home Depot protested the
questionable sourcing of the company’s wood sold in retail stores. This, and many other
similar examples, suggests that consumers place great pressure on organizations toward
non-economic decisions. Organizations’ efforts toward sustainability, or the desire to be
legitimately green, are in response to the growing expectation in our society. Therefore,
the mechanism behind earning legitimacy among consumers works differently from that
of other stakeholder groups (i.e., shareholders).
When an organization makes an effort to be green, whether through advertising,
public relations, process improvements, etc., consumers make moral evaluative
judgments separate and apart from economic judgments. To be clear, this is the process
of evaluating the organizations on its efforts, not on product price or benefit to the
consumer. This is in direct contrast to how shareholders evaluate green efforts, as
described above.
The moral evaluation process occurs because the institutional environment in which
the firm operates is one where society in general has placed pressure on the organization
to be green. Therefore, a large overlap exists between the pressure placed on the
organization and the organizations’ efforts. Unfortunately, firms fall short in fulfilling
institutional expectations and legitimacy may be compromised.
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One of the main reasons firms may fall short of fulfilling institutional expectations
(moral or economic) is because the audience cannot directly observe all underlying
objectives and actions of the firm. Therefore, organizations rely on outward signals that
stakeholders can use to make evaluations and impart (or withhold) legitimacy.
Legitimacy and Signaling
Communication is a critical component to the marketing function, and involves
conveying information to stakeholders about the organization, its motivations, practices
and procedures, as well as the organization’s offerings. Clearly, stakeholders cannot
have perfect information about all of these aspects of an organization to evaluate the
moral and economic standards of the firm, which leads to information asymmetry
(Spence, 1974). Signaling theory resulted from scholarly research examining information
asymmetry in market interactions (Spence, 1974), or when two parties have access to
different information (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). This asymmetry of
information has been a key consideration in the study of marketplace exchanges in the
accounting, finance, organizational behavior, and marketing disciplines for decades
(Kirmani & Rao 2000).
Since information affects how people behave in the marketplace (Dawar & Parker,
1994; Duncan & Moriarty, 1998; Yoo, Donthu, & Lee, 2000), the senders (organizations)
must act strategically in choosing what and how to communicate that information.
Further, receivers (stakeholders to an organization) must determine how to interpret the
signal. This interpretation process is inevitably viewed through the receivers’ inherent
lens through which he or she views the world.
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Since organizations must gain legitimacy to survive (Certo, 2003; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Suchman 1995), firms must signal otherwise unobservable attributes
about the firm (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Coff, 2002; Deephouse, 2000). A signal is
a piece of information that a seller wishes to convey to a consumer, for example, with the
hopes that the signal will increase that organization’s legitimacy (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).
In other words, if a consumer interprets an organization’s actions in a way that is
consistent with that consumer’s expectations, legitimacy is granted to the firm.
How, then, does a firm earn legitimacy as a green organization when its practices
and procedures are often unobservable? Organizations perform activities that
demonstrate collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner (Meyer &
Rowan, 1991). In other words, strategic behaviors or organizational structures are
created that show the audience how the firm is responding to institutional pressures to be
green.
Structures act as proxies or signals by which stakeholders can judge those actions
that may not be visible to or quantifiable by the pertinent audience. For example, Bern’s
Steakhouse, a destination restaurant in Tampa, Florida since 1956, purports to have a
green corporate philosophy that is largely unobservable to customers. The marketing
managers at Bern’s Steakhouse created organizational structures visible to their
customers. First, the restaurant owns and operates a farm from which the restaurant
sources its produce and meat. As guests peruse the menu, the waiter mentions the farm in
hopes that diners will view Bern’s Steakhouse as a sustainable organization.
Additionally, a guided tour of the kitchen shows off an impressive composting operation,
and the compost materials are then used on the company’s farm. Both of these structures
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allow customers to make a meaningful a judgment regarding how well Bern’s fulfills its
claim of being green.
The behaviors described above are intended to signal that Bern’s cares about
sustainability and acts accordingly. If consumers accurately interpret Berns’ signals,
Bern’s Steakhouse earns moral legitimacy as a green organization. As stated earlier, it is
assumed that since sustainability is a socially-constructed expectation, economic
judgments will come after moral judgments with regard to sustainability efforts by an
organization.
In contrast, consider the above example from a shareholder perspective. As
discussed, shareholders are primarily economically driven and expect a return on their
investment. This motivation leads shareholders to interpret a firm’s signals differently
than consumers interpret the same signals. For example, an investor might view a farm
as an extreme expense and liability, and thus judge Bern’s signal to be green as a bad
thing. This highlights the importance of signal interpretation depending upon the
stakeholder.
Signaling and greenwashing. Greenwashing is a term given to the act of
overstating or otherwise misleading others about an organization’s environmental
attributes or attributes of their offerings (Ottman, 2010). Depending on the degree of
overstatement or misleading information, greenwashing tactics result in undermining
consumer confidence due to growing skepticism. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, greenwashing is disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to
present an environmentally responsible public image; a public image of environmental
responsibility promulgated by or for an organization but perceived as being unfounded or
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intentionally misleading. Basically, greenwashing is a form of signaling information
about the environmental practices and/or credentials of an organization, and may range
from incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading information to outright deceptive or false
information.
The marketing literature has considered the effect of many signals on consumers
such as brand name, price, and physical appearance (Chu & Chu, 1994; Dawar & Parker,
1994; Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990; Grewal, Krishnan, Baker & Borin, 1998; Wernerfelt,
1988). These are important consumer and organizational topics in marketing, but we
have a rare opportunity for research in a much more fundamental capacity. Through this
research, we gain insight into how organizations’ signals contribute to or detract from
earning legitimacy in the emerging institutional expectation for firms to be green.
Just as with ethical behaviors in general, organizations develop products and
marketing programs with green qualities (Martin, Johnson, & French, 2011). For some
firms, green qualities infuse the entire firm as well as every decision made by the
organization’s leaders. For other firms, green qualities are superficial at best.
Institutional theory scholars have categorized legitimacy efforts into two general
strategies: (1) substantive efforts and (2) symbolic efforts (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990;
Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). Substantive efforts are defined as an approach that
involves “real, material change in organizational goals, structures, and processes or
socially institutionalized practices” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Symbolic efforts come
into play when, rather than changing its ways, an organization that engages in symbolic
efforts merely “portray or symbolically manage practices so as to appear consistent with

32

social values and expectations” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Richardson, 1985). These
symbolic efforts are often equated to greenwashing.
Substantive vs. Symbolic Green Efforts
Organizations seek legitimacy via numerous practices, and early institutional theory
suggests the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often presumed to be
sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Existing literature calls this
symbolic management wherein organizations merely appear to be consistent with
institutional expectations rather than actually embracing the social values underlying
those institutions (Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). Symbolic actions alone, however,
have been criticized as an insufficient means to earning legitimacy. An alternative to
symbolic management is known as substantive management. Because findings are
inconclusive, the opportunity is ripe to investigate the necessary level of effort to earn
environmental legitimacy. This dissertation begins to answer this question by
considering how organizational efforts toward environmental sustainability are perceived
by important stakeholders to the firm, and how those efforts affect the organization.
Chapter Summary
This chapter set the stage for two studies that consider how organizational efforts
toward environmental sustainability are perceived by important stakeholders to the firm,
and how those efforts affect the organization. Institutional theory explains that every
decision made by an organization’s leaders must be considered in light of the
environment created by normative and pragmatic stakeholder expectations. Furthermore,
stakeholder theory dovetails nicely with institutional theory in this vein since firms
increasingly parse resources based on which stakeholder group will be affected by certain
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strategic decisions. More specifically, to attend to the often conflicting needs of different
stakeholders and the institutional environment surrounding each stakeholder group, this
dissertation considers how firms can answer the call to be environmentally sustainable
and still maintain legitimacy with important stakeholders.
The next chapter contains an experimental study based on consumer reactions to
varying levels of environmental sustainability efforts. Chapter 4 contains an event study
that measures the effect of environmental sustainability efforts on shareholder wealth.
These two studies offer insights into considerations managers must take before creating
plans toward becoming green organizations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEGITIMACY OF AN ORGANIZATION’S ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY
Environmental research related to marketing and management strategies has
increased in recent years, but most often these issues are analyzed from either a case
study, customer-type (business to business, business to consumer), or industry
perspective. While the findings from prior research offer important insights, a more
fundamental approach gives academics and practitioners an understanding of 1) how their
efforts toward environmental sustainability are perceived by important stakeholders, and
2) the path to earning legitimacy as a green organization.
This chapter integrates some of the constructs discussed in Chapter 2 into a
hypothesized model of consumers’ perceptions of green organizational behaviors. Based
on this model, research hypotheses are proposed to measure outcomes from consumers’
perspectives that are critical to long-term survival of an organization: attitude toward the
company and legitimacy. This will provide a useful framework to highlight the issues
surrounding the institutional environment facing a firm seeking environmental
sustainability.
Conceptual Development
To better understand the effectiveness of the strategies available to organizations to
become legitimately green, it is important to first understand the difference between two
main strategies an organization can choose to signal its commitment to sustainability.
Institutional Theory posits that consumers perceive organizations to be legitimate when
firms employ a substantive green strategy as opposed to a symbolic green strategy
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(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). It is thought
that a firm using a substantive approach may result in greater legitimacy and enjoy more
positive stakeholder reactions. Therefore, we assume that the same is true for a firm
seeking green legitimacy. Conversely, a firm using a symbolic approach is assumed to be
merely attempting to portray the image of being green without truly embracing a green
philosophy.
To determine legitimacy and customer support of a firm following green
organizational effort, environmental sustainability effort (ESE) is conceptualized as the
level of substantive or symbolic behavior demonstrated by the firm. The level of
legitimacy and attitude toward the company will depend on the level of effort
(substantive vs. symbolic vs. no effort), and the strength and nature of that relation will
depend upon two key non-economic consumer characteristics: skepticism toward
environmental claims, and consumers’ environmental concern (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Model of the Effects of Environmental Sustainability
Efforts on Non-Economic Consumer Support
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Influence of Environmental Sustainability Efforts
A 2010 survey of CEOs by Accenture found that 93% of CEOs agree that
sustainability issues are critical to their companies’ success (Lacy, Cooper, Hayward, &
Neuberger, 2010). Additionally, 96% of those CEOs believe that sustainability practices
should be an integral part of strategy formation and operations (Lacy et al., 2010), yet
they readily admit that successful implementation and execution of green efforts is an
elusive task (Pohle & Hittner, 2008). So the question is not whether to incorporate
sustainability into corporate practice, but rather how.
Successful implementation and execution of green efforts should logically consider
how those efforts will be interpreted and responded to by a firm’s stakeholders. While
there are numerous stakeholders associated with every organization, the scope of this
dissertation includes customers and shareholders to analyze two of the most important
groups. Stakeholders impart expectations on organizations as described in the
institutionalization process. These expectations are a result of societal values, and
organizations must adhere to these institutional prescriptions to earn legitimacy in
stakeholders’ eyes. Consequently, compliance with institutional expectations translates
into more positive feelings toward the organization, legitimacy, and overall support of the
organization. Unfortunately, firms cannot merely copy another firm’s green efforts and
earn legitimacy as a green organization.
Organizations seek legitimacy via numerous practices, and early institutional theory
suggests the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often presumed to be
sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Existing literature calls this
symbolic management wherein organizations merely appear to be consistent with
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institutional expectations rather than actually embracing the social values underlying
those institutions (Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). Symbolic actions alone, however,
have been criticized as an insufficient means to earning legitimacy. An alternative to
symbolic management is known as substantive management. This approach involves
adoption of organizational goals and processes that genuinely adhere to the appropriate
institutional expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). As
Richardson (1985) and others have done, this study conceptualizes symbolic and
substantive actions as a simple dichotomy.
Scholars in institutional theory and legitimacy define symbolic and substantive
actions as follows:
Symbolic Actions. These actions do not involve real changes, but attempts to
portray corporate activities as compatible with societal norms and values, thus giving the
impression of compliance with social expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer,
1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Symbolic actions involve
talking about what the organization does, but the symbolically green organization has
little to back up those claims.
Substantive Actions. This approach involves real, substantive changes in
organizational processes, goals, structures, and socially institutionalized expectations
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). The
substantive green organization walks the walk and has proof of the same.
Generally, while legitimacy is a goal of all organizations, managers often choose
symbolic actions over substantive actions to maintain flexibility and save the costs
inherent in more substantive legitimacy efforts (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman,
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1995). The dichotomy between the two types of actions in an environmental context has
been called green talk (symbolic actions) versus green walk (substantive actions) (Walker
& Wan, 2011). In other words, firms that merely talk the talk are not genuinely
embracing green efforts versus those firms that walk the walk are genuinely embracing
green efforts. Further, symbolic actions have been equated to greenwashing in academic
literature and mainstream media (Laufer, 2003; Ramus and Montiel, 2005; Terrachoice,
2010).

In most cases an organization will not set a goal of deceiving consumers, but

symbolic green efforts may be the only choice for the organization due to lack of
resources or inattention to the effect it may have on consumers’ perceptions.
Legitimacy
According to institutional theory scholars, legitimacy is broadly defined as “a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions” (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is considered a resource (Dowling and
Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). In terms of the environment, society has begun to place
value on preserving our natural resources, and organizations that show an environmental
consciousness are seen desirable and acting appropriately within these expectations.
Research findings show that institutional legitimacy leads to increased reputational
capital (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Hart, 1995) and is considered a resource (Dowling &
Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). By understanding consumers’ perceptions of a firm’s
legitimacy based on actions of the firm, marketers can better develop programs in the
area of corporate social responsibility, thus saving time, effort and money on potentially
ineffective green efforts.

Institutional theory supports the notion that society
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perceives organizations to be legitimate when the effort to act in a desirable and
appropriate way is genuine and sincere (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995).
Specifically, when organizations adopt substantive changes to processes, procedure,
products, and goals, the perception is that the firm is making substantive efforts toward
appropriate behavior (Walker & Wan, 2011). In the context of environmental
sustainability, substantive efforts (i.e., reducing waste through production) will more
closely fulfill the expectation that firms act appropriately. Thus, the following hypothesis
is extended:
H1a: Substantive (vs. Symbolic) ESE will yield significantly higher levels of
Legitimacy.
Research supports the notion that society recognizes a difference between real,
substantive efforts to act appropriately and those efforts that are shallow (i.e. using a
green colored label and terminology purporting environmental sustainability) and perhaps
considered greenwashing (e.g., Walker and Wan, 2011). However, we don’t know the
effect of these more symbolic efforts on earning legitimacy.
To earn legitimacy, a firm must appear to conform to institutional expectations. In
other words, to be seen as environmentally sustainable, a firm must signal to consumers
that it makes some level of effort in this regard. Oliver (1991) suggests that the
appearance rather than the fact of conformity with environmental expectations is
sufficient to earn legitimacy. In other words, symbolic efforts that appear to be consistent
with expectations of being environmentally sustainable will earn the firm some level of
legitimacy, but not necessarily the same level of legitimacy as substantive efforts.

40

Therefore, the following hypothesis is extended:
H1b: Symbolic (vs. No) ESE will yield significantly higher levels of Legitimacy.

Attitude toward the Company
Attitudes have been defined as the overall assessment of objects, issues, or people
derived from behavioral, cognitive and affective information experiences (Petty, Unnava,
& Strathman, 1991; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Thus, attitudes about a company
are formed based on how well it assures customers of future behavior. Not only do
attitudes derive directly from observed behavior, but also from the unobservable signals
received from an organization. Furthermore, organizations that provide a sense of being
green enjoy improved attitude toward the company (Pirsch, Gupta, & Grau, 2007).
It should be noted, however, that a positive attitude toward the company requires a
lower level of effort than earning legitimacy. For example, in a study where consumers
were exposed to an advertisement that contained a message indicating corporate social
responsibility on the part of the company, attitude toward the company was higher than
for those consumers who received a similar message without the corporate social
responsibility element (Nan & Heo, 2007). Therefore, while a strong positive attitude
toward the company is important, inclusion of the attitude construct in this research is to
highlight the difference between attitude toward the company and legitimacy. An
organization can garner consumers’ positive attitudes toward the company by merely
signaling environmental consciousness, but those behaviors may not necessarily cross the
threshold of earning legitimacy. Thus, the following hypothesis is extended:
H2: Any level (Substantive or Symbolic) of ESE (vs. No ESE) will yield
significantly higher levels of Attitude toward the Company.
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Skepticism toward Environmental Claims
In general, skepticism refers to peoples’ tendency to doubt, disbelieve, and question
(e.g., Boush, Friestad, & Rose, 1994; Forehand & Grier, 2003). While skepticism is
related to the concepts of cynicism, trust/distrust, and suspicion, skepticism differs in
several qualitative ways. Specifically, cynicism is an enduring quality of people who act
selfishly across contexts and throughout time (Mohr, Eroglu, & Ellen, 1998). Suspicion
involves an assumption that a motive is being hidden (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990).
Trust and distrust both include an element of prediction. In other words, if one can be
trusted, his behavior in context can be predicted to some extent (Cho, 2006).
Research shows that the majority of consumers are skeptical about environmental
claims (Chan & Lau, 2004; Mohr, Eroglu, & Ellen, 1998). Furthermore, consumers who
are skeptical of environmental claims reduce marketplace efficiencies by rendering green
efforts less effective (Pollay & Mittal, 1993). On the other hand, there is an argument
that skepticism maintains a healthy viewpoint from which to make informed decisions,
according to the Federal Trade Commission and other public policy voices. Therefore, it
behooves companies that are genuinely green to demonstrate that greenness through
substantive behaviors (as opposed to symbolic ones) stand a chance of cutting through
consumer skepticism.
Boush et al., (1994) and others treat skepticism as an enduring trait, but the majority
of findings show that skepticism varies depending upon the context and situation (e.g.,
Forehand & Grier, 2003; Mohr et al., 1998; Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). Therefore,
this research considers the level of consumer skepticism toward environmental claims in
such instances when the consumer is faced with an environmental claim.
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Skepticism is a cognitive response that varies by input (Forehand & Grier, 2003),
and Friestad and Wright’s (1994) study suggests that consumers actually learn how to
evaluate inputs and messages that are intended to convince or persuade the consumer.
Consumers use the knowledge that they are being persuaded as a way to evaluate the
situation and determine how best to respond to the persuasion attempt. This
phenomenon, known as persuasion knowledge, helps consumers understand what is
occurring in certain events (Kelley & Michele, 1980; Lange & Washburn, 2012) and
gives them a way of responding to that persuasion attempt (Friestad & Wright, 1994). It
is because of the variability in the persuasion knowledge phenomenon that skepticism is
seen as situation-based.
Past research confirms that consumer skepticism is an important consideration in the
marketing domain in many contexts (e.g., Mohr et al., 1998; Obermiller & Spangenberg,
1998). Since this research endeavors to create a valid and useful model of the efficacy of
organizational green efforts, the model includes consumer skepticism as a non-economic
consumer characteristic that moderates the relationship between ESE and legitimacy.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is extended to demonstrate the role of skepticism
toward environmental claims as a moderating variable in the model:
H3: Skepticism toward environmental claims will moderate the relationship between
ESE and Legitimacy such that Legitimacy will be higher for consumers high in
Skepticism toward Environmental Claims when ESE is Symbolic (vs. Substantive).
Interestingly, and in support of a major premise of this study, research shows that
consumer skepticism does not greatly influence the relationship between perceived prosocial organizational behaviors (e.g., messages touting environmental sustainability) and
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attitude (Gupta & Pirsch, 2006; Tucker, Rifon, Lee, & Reece, 2012). This phenomenon
is said to result from consumers’ perceptions about and acceptance of the fact that most
companies are doing good things not only for the sake of doing good things, but also to
make a profit.
Consumers will still have a positive attitude toward the company that signals good
corporate social responsibility, despite the perceived intentions of the company. This
premise is not without caveats. For example, if an organization is known for bad
behavior and then suddenly touts good corporate social responsibility or environmental
sustainability, those claims will be scrutinized more carefully (e.g., Bhattacharya & Sen,
2004; Brown & Dacin, 1997; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Additionally, when a
consumer is asked whether or not he will purchase a product from a company touting
environmental sustainability, it introduces an economic factor and triggers very different
evaluative criteria from what is measured here.
Environmental Concern
Environmental Concern (EC) is a concept researched in marketing and consumer
behavior for decades. According to Banerjee and McKeage (1994), the environment
became a critical concern for many following the first observance of Earth Day in 1970
which brought environmental destruction into the spotlight. Heightened media attention
surrounding air and water pollution, ozone depletion, and other environmental issues led
to increased legislation (Landler et al., 1991), as well as new products created to appeal to
those with a concern for the environment (Dillingham, 1990), and huge increases in
spending by firms on green advertising (Iyer & Banerjee, 1992).

44

Over time, research on EC has been measured in terms of socio-demographic
variables and personality indicators, with only limited success and generalization in
targeting consumers according to their pro-environmental behaviors (Schlegelmilch,
Bohlen & Diamantopoulos, 1996; von Borgstede & Andersson, 2010). Since it is likely
that people who exhibit high levels of EC are more supportive of green organizations and
their products and services, in general, an alternative segmentation approach was
considered by Schlegelmilch et al. (1996). This approach includes not only an attitude
component (attitude toward the environment, in general), but also a knowledge
component (individual levels of factual knowledge regarding specific or general
environmental issues). The knowledge element was added to curtail criticism
surrounding the weak attitude-behavior link (Bohlen et al., 1993).
Recall that organizations acquire legitimacy by fulfilling institutional expectations
(Suchman, 1995). To fulfill institutional expectations, the organizations’ actions must
convince relevant stakeholders that those behaviors are in line with the norm. In other
words, for consumers to consider a firm legitimately green, the firm must reach a level
and type of behavior that consumers deem appropriately green. The evaluation process
requires in-depth scrutiny of organizational behaviors or, in the event that behaviors
cannot be directly observed, consumers evaluate signals put forth by the organization.
To determine whether legitimacy should be granted to an organization, stakeholders
compare an organization’s actions to a set of accepted standards or norms (Scott & Lane,
2000). Stakeholders evaluating the degree to which actions match social norms calls for
a moral evaluation and confers moral legitimacy if the match is high (Aldrich & Fiol,
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1994). In making a moral evaluation of an organization, people judge not whether the
behavior benefits the person, but instead whether the behavior is the right thing to do.
Making a moral judgment, such as appropriate environmental sustainability efforts,
is influenced by ones’ prior environmental concern and knowledge (Bohlen,
Schlegelmilch, & Diamantopoulos, 1993; Delmas & Toffel, 2004; Ottman, 2010). Thus,
the following hypothesis is proposed to demonstrate the role of EC as a moderating
variable in the model:
H4: A consumer’s level of Environmental Concern will moderate the relationship
between ESE and legitimacy such that legitimacy will be higher for consumers with High
EC when ESE is Substantive (vs. Symbolic).
In an effort to understand and cope with the world around us, we seek a stable sense
of ourselves over time and across situations. This stability comes through identifying
with similar beliefs (Heider, 1958), and organizational research indicates that this need
for self-continuity is a key driver of our choice of companies with whom we interact
(Pratt, 1998). Specifically, we are likely to consider a company more attractive if the
company’s identity closely matches our own (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). Thus, it stands
to reason that those consumers who have a higher level of concern for the environment
identify more closely with companies who also demonstrate a level of concern for the
environment, and the following hypothesis is extended:
H5: A consumer’s level of Environmental Concern will moderate the relationship
between ESE and legitimacy such that legitimacy will be higher for consumers with High
EC when any level of ESE is present (Substantive or Symbolic) (vs. No ESE).
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Methodology
This section discusses the data collection, research design, and procedures used to
test the hypotheses for this study. First, this section outlines a description of the sample.
Next is a discussion of the stimuli along with explanation of the measures.
Data Collection Procedure
Participants in the experiment were recruited online using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), and were given a modest monetary incentive. MTurk is an online
resource supported by Amazon whereby researchers can conduct behavioral research
using the general population. It is possible to filter the potential subjects, if desired, and
the resource has been considered a valuable and valid one for accessing a large, stable,
and diverse subject pool (Mason & Suri, 2011). Academics now consider research that
utilizes MTurk as at least as reliable as traditional methods (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz,
2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2011).
Written scenarios were created for this study. Three scenarios were developed in the
form of a realistic press release for the opening of a new location of an auto repair shop
(Performance Auto). The press release contained a brief description of the company’s
offerings. Each scenario depended on the level of environmental sustainability effort
(ESE) on the part of the company (substantive (high effort), symbolic (low effort), or
none (no effort)).
This study also allowed a test of two non-economic consumer characteristic
moderating variables (skepticism toward environmental claims and environmental
concern). The independent variable was level of environmental sustainability effort
(ESE) by an organization, and study participants were randomly assigned to one of three
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experimental conditions (1) substantive (high) ESE, (2) symbolic (low) ESE, and (3) no
ESE.
The press release was intended to announce the opening of a new location of an
existing company, although the company name (Performance Auto) in the press release
was fictitious to minimize any confounds due to preexisting attitudes toward the firm
(Brown & Dacin, 1997; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). Similar to Tucker et al., (2012),
the stimuli were identical, but the conditions were manipulated with bullet points with
different information to convey the levels of effort. Substantive (high) ESEs were
operationalized as follows: We are the first auto repair company to partner with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish environmental guidelines for auto
repair facilities; 100% of the oil we change is recycled; We established a tire recycling
program, and customers who return old tires to us receive a discount on services at
Performance Auto. Symbolic (low) ESEs were operationalized as follows: We changed
our logo from yellow to green to reflect our environmental sensitivity; We created a
comfortable waiting area with a chandelier made from used spark plugs; Lounge chairs
are made from recycled soda bottles and milk jugs. The condition with No ESE
contained only the announcement of the new location opening. A scenario-based study in
the form of a press release was chosen because this method allows for easier
operationalization of the manipulations, providing more control over the variables (Dong,
Evans, & Zou, 2008).
Prior to data collection, a sample size was calculated based on statistical power using
the G*Power statistical program (Buchner, Erdfelder, & Faul, 1997). Based on the study
design, the G*Power analysis recommended a minimum sample of 150 participants (50
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per cell) to achieve a medium effect (20) with a type I error of .05 and a desired power
level of .80. With this recommendation in mind, the study was planned to include 50-60
subjects per cell.
Manipulation Test
To determine whether there was a significant difference between the three stimuli, a
manipulation test was performed prior to the experimental study. For the manipulation
test, 104 students were asked to indicate the month of their birth and then the students
were assigned to one of three treatment groups as follows: students with birthdays in
January, April, July, or October received the substantive (high effort) scenario, students
with birthdays in February, May, August, or November received the symbolic (low
effort) scenario, and students with birthdays in March, June, September, and December
received the scenario with no environmental sustainability effort apparent by the
company.
Participants were asked to read the press release and then rate the company on seven
scales set up as 7-point likert style questions to establish the participant’s perceived level
of the company’s environmental sustainability effort. A one-way ANOVA indicated a
significant difference between the three levels of effort (F = 42.17, p < .001) with means
(high (substantive effort) = 5.16, low (symbolic effort) = 4.66, and no effort = 3.14).
High ESE was significantly greater than Low ESE (F = 4.26, p < .05), and Low ESE was
significantly greater than No ESE (F = 74.62, p < 0.05).
Psychometric Evaluation of Study Measures
All of the constructs in the experimental study were operationalized based on
previous research and adapted for this study. Prior to analysis, the data for the study was
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reviewed for any missing or inappropriate answers (e.g., marking “7” for all questions).
For this study, 27 questionnaires were removed reducing the sample size to 256.
Measures for the study were initially assessed by calculating their reliabilities, which
ranged from .91 to 93. All reliabilities exceeded the acceptable .70 threshold (Nunnally,
1978). A summary of the measures and reliabilities is presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Summary of Measurement Instruments
Construct

Reliability

Skepticism toward
Environmental Claims

.91

Environmental Concern

.93

Legitimacy

.92

Attitudes toward Company

.93

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in AMOS was used to assess the validity of
the dependent measures (legitimacy and attitude toward the company) and covariates
(skepticism toward environmental claims and environmental concern). The fit of the
measurement model was strong based on commonly recognized fit statistics. Despite the
chi square statistic being significant (χ2 = 498.72, df = 178, p < .001), other measures of
model fit, including the comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and standardized root mean residual
(SRMR) indicate that the data adequately fit the measurement model (see Table 3). In
addition, all items loaded significantly on their respective variables (see Table 4).
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Table 3
Measurement Model Fit Statistics
Model
CFI
TLI
ESE

.97

.96

RMSE
A

SRMR

.06

.03

The scales were further assessed by evaluating convergent and discriminant validity.
Evidence of convergent validity was provided by examining each construct’s average
variance extracted (AVE). Using Fornell and Larker’s (1981) criterion, a construct was
deemed to exhibit convergent validity with an AVE of .50 or greater. As shown in Table
4, the AVE for all study constructs exceeded this cut-off.
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Table 4
Measurement Model Loadings
Construct
Skepticism toward
Environmental
Claims

Measurement Item
I think most environmental
claims are untrue
I do not believe most
environmental claims

3.51

.83

.000

3.88

.92

.000

Most environmental claims
are exaggerated
This company sets a good
example overall

4.15

.86

.000

4.90

.80

.000

This company is committed
to meeting customers’ standards
for being green

4.82

.90

.000

This company genuinely
listens to its customers regarding
sustainable practices
I dislike the company/I like
the company

4.66

.86

.000

5.38

.86

.000

I react unfavorably to the
company/I react favorably to the
company

5.33

.88

.000

I feel negative toward the
company/I feel positive toward the
company

5.33

.91

.000

5.33

.86

.000

5.70

.82

.000

Does not matter to
me/Matters a lot to me

5.46

.86

.000

Not personally
relevant/Personally relevant

5.36

.88

.000

Does not involve
me/Involves me a lot

5.32

.87

.000

5.42

.89

.000

Most environmental claims
are intended to mislead consumers

Legitimacy

Attitude toward the
Company

Environmental
Concern

Convergent Validity
Mean Std. Estimate P-Value AVE
3.53
.78
.000
.72

The company is bad/The
company is good
Unimportant/Important

Little concern/Great concern
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.75

.77

.75

To indicate discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE should be greater
than the correlations for each construct with the other constructs (Fornell and Larker,
1999). As shown in Table 5, all square roots of the AVE are greater than the constructs’
correlations, indicating discriminant validity.

Table 5
Discriminant Validity of Model Constructs

a

Construct

CR

AVE 1.

1. SKEP

0.91

0.72

0.84a

2. LEGIT

0.92

0.74

-0.32

0.86a

3. ATT

0.93

0.76

-0.22

0.65

0.87a

4. EC

0.93

0.74

-0.13

0.27

0.42

Square Root of AVE

2.

3.

4.

0.86a

b

Correlation Coefficients significant at .05 level.

This section provided the data collection, research design and procedures that were
used to test the hypotheses for this dissertation on environmental sustainability efforts.
First, the data collection process was discussed, including the power analysis, sample
framing and stimuli selection. Second, an analysis of the manipulation test was presented.
Finally, psychometric evaluations of the study’s measures were conducted and discussed,
including reliabilities of all scales, confirmatory factor analyses and measurement model
fit for this study.
Results
To evaluate the effect of the ESE manipulation on the dependent variables, a
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with follow-up univariate tests and
contrasts were performed. Multivariate effects were significant for ESE (Wilks’ Lambda
= .836, F = 11.79, p < .05). This indicates that the level of ESE has a significant impact
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on non-economic consumer support outcomes. Next, univariate results show that the
main effect for ESE was significant for legitimacy (F = 19.33, p < .05), but not
significant for attitude toward the company (F = 1.47, p = .23). The covariates age,
education, and income were also included in the model. The covariate education (Wilks’
Lambda = .96, F = 4.32, p < .014) had a significant multivariate test statistic, indicating
that education accounts for a significant amount of variance in the models. Age (Wilks’
Lambda = .98, F = 2.72, p = .09) and income (Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = .35, p = .59) did
not have significant effects on the relationship, which implies that age and income did not
matter for this study.
Pairwise contrasts suggest that the ESE treatment conditions resulted in greater
legitimacy compared to the no ESE group (t = 5.78, p = .000), indicating that any level of
ESE results in significantly greater legitimacy than performing no ESE. I was
specifically interested in the effect on legitimacy between low/symbolic ESE and
high/substantive ESE and the difference between low/symbolic ESE and no ESE.
Separate pairwise contrasts indicate that high/substantive ESE resulted in significantly
higher levels legitimacy as compared to low/symbolic ESE (Mhigh/substantive = 5.31 vs.
Mlow/symbolic = 4.78; t = 2.53, p < .01) in support of H1a.

Additionally, low/symbolic ESE

produced significantly higher levels of legitimacy than no ESE (Mlow/symbolic = 4.78 vs.
Mno effort = 3.99; t = 3.799, p < .000) in support of H1b. Since there was no significant
difference in the level of ESE on attitude toward the company, H2 is not supported.
To test the potential moderating effects of skepticism toward environmental claims
and environmental concern, spotlight analysis was performed using ModProbe, a macro
made for SPSS. The analysis follows the procedures recommended by Aiken and West
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(1991) and outlined by Fitzsimons (2008), and considered the possible moderating effect
at plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean of legitimacy. The participants
in the study who demonstrated high skepticism toward environmental claims indicated
lower legitimacy for a company that used symbolic or low level ESE, but the differences
were not significant (β = -.064, p = .22). Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported.
The same process was followed to determine whether environmental concern
moderates the relationship between ESE and legitimacy, as proposed in H4. Once again,
the output indicates that participants high in environmental concern rate the organization
with greater legitimacy when ESE is substantive/high, but the difference is not significant
(β = .016, p = .77). Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Finally, hypothesis 5 predicted that environmental concern would moderate the
relationship between ESE and attitude toward the company. Following spotlight
analysis at plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean of environmental
concern, we see that in fact participants higher in environmental concern show greater
attitude toward the company when ESE is either substantive/high or symbolic/low (vs. no
ESE), but the differences are not significant (β = .036, p = .45). Thus, hypothesis 5 is not
supported.
Section Summary
This section reported the results for the hypothesis tests that were developed for this
study. The first two hypotheses investigated the main effect of environmental
sustainability effort on legitimacy and attitude toward the company. Results supported
the effect of environmental sustainability effort on legitimacy, but not for attitude toward
the company, even when controlling for age, education, and income. The level of
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environmental sustainability effort directly affects the level of legitimacy reported by the
subjects, but the level of environmental sustainability effort does not affect the level of
attitude the subject has toward the company. Furthermore, while not hypothesized, even
symbolic/low environmental sustainability effort produced higher levels of legitimacy
than no environmental sustainability effort.
The last three hypotheses investigated the relationship between the level of
environmental sustainability effort and skepticism toward environmental claims and
environmental concern as they relate to legitimacy and attitude toward the company.
Results did not support the relationship between skepticism and environmental concern
with level of environmental sustainability effort, and legitimacy and attitude toward the
company were not significantly affected by those relationships.
The next section will further discuss these results, along with practical implications
of these research findings, limitations of the current research, and suggestions for future
research.
Discussion and Conclusions
The last section described the data analysis techniques used in this study and the
results of the data analysis for the hypothesis testing were presented. Table 6 is a
summary of the hypotheses and the results of the hypothesis testing completed in the last
section.
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Table 6
Summary Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hyp.

Independent Variable(s)

Dependent Variable

Supported

H1a-b

Environmental Sustainability Effort

Legitimacy

Yes

H2

Environmental Sustainability Effort

Attitude toward the
Company

No

H3

Environmental Sustainability Effort
X Skepticism toward
Environmental Claims

Legitimacy

No

Environmental Sustainability Effort
X Environmental Concern

Legitimacy

No

Environmental Sustainability Effort
X Environmental Concern

Attitudes toward Company

No

H4

H5

This research intended to contribute to academic literature on environmental
sustainability by demonstrating the difference between of earning legitimacy and merely
earning customer support for the company in the way of a positive attitude. As
sustainability becomes an institution in our society, and as managers and executives are
realizing the benefits of integrating sustainability efforts into their organizations, research
in this area is paramount.
Influence of Type of Environmental Sustainability Effort
Stakeholders impart both economic and non-economic expectations on organizations
as described in the institutionalization process. Expectations for an organization to act
environmentally sustainably in a non-economic sense (i.e., not considering economic
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aspects, such as price, as elements of evaluation) mirrors societal values, and
organizations must adhere to these institutional prescriptions to earn legitimacy in
stakeholders’ eyes. Consequently, compliance with institutional expectations translates
into more positive feelings toward the organization, legitimacy, and overall support of the
organization.
Organizations seek legitimacy via numerous practices, and early institutional theory
suggests that the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often presumed to be
sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Existing literature calls this
symbolic management wherein organizations merely appear to be consistent with
institutional expectations rather than actually embracing the social values underlying
those institutions (Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985). Symbolic actions alone, however,
have been criticized as an insufficient means to earning legitimacy. An alternative to
symbolic management is known as substantive management. This approach involves
adoption of organizational goals and processes that genuinely adhere to the appropriate
institutional expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981; Richardson, 1985).
Successful implementation and execution of green efforts should logically consider
how those efforts will be interpreted and responded to by a firm’s stakeholders.
Stakeholders cannot have perfect information about all of these aspects of an organization
to evaluate the moral and economic standards of the firm, which leads to information
asymmetry (Spence, 1974). Signaling theory resulted from scholarly research
surrounding information asymmetry in market interactions (Spence, 1974), or when two
parties have access to different information (Connelly et al., 2011). To reduce
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uncertainty, organizations must carefully determine how to communicate firm values to
customers and other stakeholders.
Since organizations must gain legitimacy to survive (Certo, 2003; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995), firms must signal otherwise unobservable attributes
about the firm (Certo et al., 2001; Coff, 2002; Deephouse, 2000). A signal is a piece of
information that a seller wishes to convey to a consumer, for example, with the hopes that
the signal will increase that organization’s legitimacy (Kirmani & Rao, 2000. In other
words, if a consumer interprets an organization’s actions in a way that are in line with
that consumers’ expectations, legitimacy is granted to the firm.
Unfortunately, the process of institutionalization often includes mimetic behaviors,
wherein an organization merely copies the actions of other firms believed to be
successful in gaining legitimacy. This research reveals that environmental sustainability
efforts of any level are good for earning legitimacy and a more positive attitude toward
the company. However, and more importantly, organizations earn greater legitimacy
when practicing substantive or high-level environmental sustainability efforts.
Moderating Effect of Skepticism toward Environmental Claims
If consumers are to interpret organizations’ messages toward sustainability in a way
that earns the organization legitimacy, the messages must be believable to consumers.
Research shows that the majority of consumers are skeptical about environmental claims
(Chan & Lau, 2004; Mohr, Eroglu, & Ellen, 1998), and consumers who are skeptical of
environmental claims reduce marketplace efficiencies by rendering green efforts less
effective (Pollay & Mittal, 1993).
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Past research confirms that consumer skepticism as an important consideration in the
marketing domain in many contexts (e.g., Mohr et al., 1998; Obermiller & Spangenberg,
1998), and since this research endeavored to create a valid and useful model of the
efficacy of organizational green efforts, the model included consumer skepticism as a
non-economic consumer characteristic that moderates the relationship between ESE and
legitimacy.
No support was found for the relationship between ESE and skepticism toward
environmental claims insofar as how consumers grant legitimacy. Legitimacy was not
statistically different at any level of effort even for the most skeptical consumers.
Consumers may not view a press release as a persuasion attempt since it is informative in
nature and not attempting to sell a product. Further research is necessary to determine the
threshold at which consumers’ skepticism is triggered and affects legitimacy granted to
the green organization.
Although not a hypothesis in this study, research shows that consumer skepticism
does not greatly influence the relationship between perceived pro-social organizational
behaviors (e.g., messages touting environmental sustainability) and attitude (Gupta and
Pirsch, 2006; Tucker, Rifon, Lee, & Reece, 2012). This phenomenon is said to result
from consumers’ perceptions about and acceptance of the fact that most companies are
doing good things not only for the sake of doing good things, but also to make a profit.
Analysis of the data in this study surrounding the relationship between ESE and
skepticism as related to attitude toward the company supported these findings.
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Moderating Effect of Environmental Concern
Environmental concern has been an important element in research for many years
from a both consumer perspective as well as an organization perspective. The
environment is an important, non-economic factor that can and should be included in all
marketing decisions such as communications, segmentation, positioning, and channels.
Over time, research on EC has been measured in terms of socio-demographic
variables and personality indicators, with only limited success and generalization in
targeting consumers according to their pro-environmental behaviors (Schlegelmilch, et
al., 1996; von Borgstede & Andersson, 2010). An alternative segmentation approach was
considered by Schlegelmilch et al. (1996) since it is likely that people who exhibit high
levels of EC are more generally more supportive of green organizations, products, and
services. This approach includes not only an attitude component (attitude toward the
environment, in general), but also a knowledge component (individual levels of factual
knowledge regarding specific or general environmental issues). The knowledge element
was added to curtail criticism surrounding the weak attitude-behavior link (Bohlen et al.,
1993).
It was predicted that both legitimacy and attitude toward the company would be
greater for high environmentally concern consumers when the message included a
substantive/high level of environmental sustainability effort on the part of the
organization. No statistically significant support was found for the interaction of ESE
and environmental concern, although a close look at the data reveal a trend toward the
hypothesized expectations. Those consumers with greater environmental concern
evaluated the company more positively when some level (substantive or symbolic) of

61

environmental sustainability effort was present as compared to when no effort was
present.
Perhaps environmental concern becomes an important factor once a consumer is
faced with a behavioral decision rather than merely an evaluative decision (such as
legitimacy or attitude toward the company). Further research is necessary to determine
whether environmental concern may be a mediating variable between attitude toward the
company and legitimacy and purchase or patronage intentions.
Implications for Practitioners
As confirmed by this research, earning legitimacy requires a higher level of
evaluation than earning a positive attitude toward the company. Legitimacy requires a
moral evaluation by the consumer, which calls upon socially constructed norms and
expectations. Over the years, environmental sustainability has begun to come into its
own as an institution in our society, and consumers are beginning to come together in an
understanding of what it means for an organization to be environmentally sustainable. As
organizations meet these expectations, they earn legitimacy as green companies.
Since consumers cannot always directly observe what organizations do to be green,
those organizations must disseminate information to consumers to signal their level of
conformance with environmental expectations. Consumers interpret these signals and
evaluate the company based on the degree to which those signals meet expectations.
Signaling theory is concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two
parties. This research helps practitioners understand that in the situation where an
organization is truly green, and the underlying goal of management is to earn legitimacy
as a green organization, then substantive efforts are essential. Conversely, if the
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organization is merely concerned with garnering a generally positive attitude toward the
company, then symbolic/low level environmental sustainability efforts will suffice.
It seems unfortunate to think that efforts to be green that are often considered
greenwashing can be successful, but this appears to be true with this population. Success,
however, in this instance would not be defined as earning legitimacy as a green
organization.
Limitations of the Research
As with any experimental research design, there are limitations to the present study
that must be addressed. In this case, the generalizability of the study’s results, the use of
fictitious companies to develop the stimuli, and data collection setting online are the key
limitations in this study.
First, using a fictitious company was important to the manipulation. To prevent any
existing knowledge about or bias toward or against a particular company, the subjects
must not have been familiar with the company used in the stimulus. Moreover, the
chosen company was an automobile repair shop. Age was not a factor in the study and
limited significance was found, however, use of another type of company may yield
different results.
Next, because this study was conducted online, the researcher had little control over
the actual completion of the experiment. While all questions were mandatory before the
subject could advance in the questionnaire, individuals viewed the study on their own
time outside of the control of the researcher. Possible distractions could have occurred
while the subjects completed the questionnaire online.
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In an effort to curb distractions, questions were imbedded in the study to confirm the
subject read the scenarios and paid attention to the questions. The limited number of
incorrect responses to these questions revealed that the majority of the subjects were
attentive as they took the online study, minimizing this limitation. Additionally, those
questionnaires that answered every question the same were eliminated since those
subjects clearly did not answer accurately. While there are limitations to collecting data
online, there are also limitations to distributing questionnaires in a personal setting. More
control is granted in person; however, time is usually limited based on having access to
subjects. Additionally, access to a broad population is limited with in-person
experiments.
Finally, the data for this study (i.e., independent and dependent variables) were
gathered from a single source, which may have introduced common method variance
(CMV). Care was taken to eliminate the possibility of CMV by arrangement of the
questionnaire constructs, ensuring anonymity, spatially separating independent and
dependent variables, as well as other recommendations found in the literature (Podsakoff,
McKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
Future Research Directions
Countless research opportunities exist to better understand how environmental
sustainability is becoming an institution since this is the first study that considers how
legitimacy is earned as a green organization. First, for example, trust is a closely related
but separate construct to legitimacy although trust is generated within the individual and
legitimacy is a socially-constructed phenomenon.
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Trust and legitimacy are different concepts, and it is not purported that leads to or
precedes the other. However, it has been established that “audiences perceive the
legitimate organization not only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more
predictable, and more trustworthy” (Suchman, 1995, p. 575). To this end, legitimacy is a
an amalgam of met expectations that are among the building blocks of trust, and
consequently the lack of trust is often a symptom of underlying legitimacy problems.
As environmental sustainability becomes an established institution in our society,
it is crucial to understand the role that trust plays in earning legitimacy. Moreover, we
have seen numerous instances where organizations act irresponsibly (i.e., BP) and
practitioners would be well-served with scholarly research that lays the foundation for
meaningful strategic decisions. In other words, BP likely does not know exactly how it
should market itself as a green organization, or whether it is even possible to (re)gain the
trust and legitimacy it once had following the catastrophic environmental disaster on
Deepwater Horizon in 2010.
Second, this research assumed that two important constructs, skepticism and
environmental concern, would interact with the level of effort put forth by an
organization and that interaction would affect legitimacy and attitude. Since this was not
the case, further research is necessary to determine what role skepticism and
environmental concern (among other possible constructs) play in evaluating the green
organization. As mentioned earlier, these may be constructs that do not come into play
until and unless a person makes a behavioral decision such as intent to or actual
purchase/patronage of an organization. Because consumers support organizations whose
practices and values are in line with their own, and because making a moral and/or
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attitudinal evaluation of an organization bears less risk than actually purchasing from or
patronizing a company, these are important future research questions to better understand
legitimacy as a green organization.
While the findings for this study were not strong, there are several important areas
for future research. Developing a new stream of sustainability research that combines
legitimacy and trust, as well as behavioral elements, could provide interesting theoretical
and practical implications for future research.
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CHAPTER 4
SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUPPLIER
SUSTAINABILITY SCORECARD
Assuming that the main social responsibility of business is to increase its profits
(Friedman, 1970), why would any company dedicate valuable resources to environmental
sustainability efforts? At times, the decision to incorporate environmental sustainability
efforts into corporate practice is voluntary. At other times, organizations are forced to do
so through government or supply chain mandates. This research investigates the effects
of environmental mandates on suppliers. Specifically, shareholder wealth is evaluated in
order to determine how shareholders perceive involuntary environmental mandates.
Concerns about sustainability and how it affects the organization, stakeholders, and
society in general have grown dramatically in the last two decades among practitioners,
policy-makers, and academic researchers (e.g., Carraher et al., 2008; Connelly et al.,
2011; MSI, 2010; Webster, 2009). Important research stems from firms’ choosing to
adopt environmental sustainability efforts, but it is critical to understand the effect on
firms facing new laws, regulations, and other expectations that will force managers to
reduce the impact on the environment. For example, last year the government announced
that the auto industry must find a way to increase average fuel economy of all new cars to
approximately 54 mpg by the year 2025.
Research has not considered the effects of such mandates. Instead, existing research,
in large part, considers how voluntary sustainability efforts affect financial performance
(e.g., Orlitzky et al., 2003; Peloza & Shang, 2011; Rowley & Berman, 2000; Walsh,
Weber, & Margolis, 2003). Criticism arises, however, around the idea that there are
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many other factors that affect how shareholders perceive any corporate change or
decision, thus muddying the waters in the measure of corporate performance. Classic
transaction cost analysis of the firm, for example, assumes that individuals and, in turn,
firms act opportunistically and selfishly whenever possible (Williamson, 1985). Thus,
shareholders may suspect that any organizational change or decision is a result of
opportunism and react accordingly.
Since this study considers the effect of mandated environmental sustainability
efforts, it reduces or even eliminates the element of opportunism. Whether or not the
supplier firm complies with the mandate is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the
measure of shareholder wealth captures shareholders’ perceptions of firms’ current state
and, thus, the ease with which firms can adapt to comply with the mandate.
Results demonstrate that shareholder response to the mandate is positive, but the
positive effect is strengthened/weakened when considering other factors used by
shareholders to evaluate the adaptability of the firm. These factors include transparency
of environmental impact and efforts toward sustainability and degree of financial
leverage. These findings provide three major contributions to the existing literature.
First, the overwhelming majority of research focuses on voluntary efforts toward
environmental sustainability (e.g. Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011). Mandates made by
governments, non-governmental entities, and other organizations are a growing part of
moving toward environmental sustainability. Firms must be prepared to respond to and
comply with a variety of mandates so as not to degrade shareholder support of the firm.
Findings from this study inform managers in what characteristics are necessary in
preparation for environmental sustainability mandates.
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Second, this study identifies certain boundary conditions under which firm valuation
is highest following an environmental sustainability mandate. Managers may then apply
this knowledge to the firm in order to reduce uncertainty for shareholders, and, thus,
enhance the opportunity for positive shareholder reaction to a mandate.
Third, this research reveals that different stakeholder groups confer legitimacy to the
organization differently. Although many studies in marketing and management consider
organizational efforts as a way of obtaining legitimacy as outlined by institutional theory
(e.g., Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010), none of the studies take into account
different stakeholder needs and expectations and the conditions for conferring legitimacy.
Instead, existing research in institutional theory and legitimacy focus on normative
processes, and focus mostly on the organization, rather than the stakeholder. In order to
gain a richer understanding of how organizational efforts to be environmentally
sustainable affect shareholders, this research moves beyond normative legitimacy and
moral explanations to how shareholders grant a different kind of legitimacy to the
organization: pragmatic legitimacy.
This chapter integrates constructs discussed in Chapter 2 into a model of shareholder
perceptions of how firms can respond to and comply with environmental mandates.
Based on this model, research hypotheses are proposed in order to measure outcomes
from the shareholder’s perspective that will answer the question of whether and how
environmental mandates increase shareholder value.
Conceptual Development
In the early 1990s, researchers began to take note of the emphasis being put on the
environment. Moreover, managers and CEOs began to realize that the environmental
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movement introduce not only introduce huge challenges, but also offer potential
opportunities for organizations. In 1994, John Elkington, in a search for language to
capture the unavoidable growth in attention to the environment, coined the term “Triple
Bottom Line” (TBL). A TBL approach means that an organization is focused not only on
the economic aspects of doing business, but also on the environmental and social value
added through its business and non-business activities (Elkington, 1997).
Certainly, not every company takes a TBL approach to doing business, but research
has revealed the benefits – and burdens – of doing so (e.g., Henriques & Richardson,
2013). The environmental component to the TBL has gained much attention in the
marketplace as well as in marketing literature in recent years, and practitioners and
academics are trying to define what sustainable practices benefit the firm, society, and the
environment.
In keeping with the underlying theory for this dissertation, it is important to
recognize that managers should acknowledge the importance of multiple stakeholder
interests and attempt to address them in a way that is mutually beneficial as a moral
obligation (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The good news for business is the obvious
potential to not only improve shareholder relations, thus encouraging further investment
by the shareholder, but also to cut costs and improve environmental performance that was
once thought impossible (Shrivastava, 1995).
Interestingly, recent research surrounding environmental sustainability actions by
firms shows mixed reactions on the part of various stakeholders. The practice of green
marketing has become highly accepted and applied in virtually every area of marketing
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from product development, to service production, to end-of-life product alternatives (i.e.
recycling) (Chen, 2010).
On one hand, research shows that most stakeholders to a firm react favorably toward
environmentally conscious companies (Bremmer, 1989; Chase, 1991; Kirkpatrick, 1990;
Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Weber, 1990). However, early academic research also
suggests that shareholders may limit investments to firms that place emphasis on
enhancing environmental performance (e.g., Azzone and Bertele, 1994).
Environmental Mandates
In an effort to reduce the cost of environmental sustainability efforts, firms are
increasingly placing pressure on suppliers and partners to do the same. Several
companies such as WalMart and Starbucks have initiated a Supplier Sustainability
Scorecard (scorecard), which gives these companies a systematic way to measure the
sustainability of their suppliers. Scorecards generally measure suppliers’ energy
expenditures, water use, waste, greenhouse gas emissions, and recycling efforts. The
power of a scorecard is immense. For example, it is estimated that the scorecard
implemented by Procter & Gamble impacted 75,000 businesses and approximately $42
billion in spending per year (GreenPlus, 2012).
Not only are scorecard mandates powerful tools for environmental preservation, but
they have other obvious effects as well. The focal firm initiating the mandate to its
suppliers has very little overall investment in the process, yet by requiring its suppliers to
comply with the mandate, the focal firm wields great power. Proctor & Gamble investors
may react positively, but this research confirms whether or not supplier’s investors also
react positively.
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Using event study methodology, this study measures the stock price of the supplier
firms on or near the date of the announcement that it is being subject to a scorecard by a
customer firm. For example, Pepsico, Inc. is a supplier to Walmart. Walmart announced
in 2009 that its suppliers must comply with Walmart’s scorecard.
Traditional thought has been that environmental expenditures reduce profitability
(Shane & Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984), and a supplier firm that must comply with a
scorecard mandate bears the cost of compliance, or risks losing business with the focal
firm. However, new exploration into stakeholder perceptions hints that there is a positive
correlation between an organization’s environmental stewardship and overall corporate
performance (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan, & Kobeissi, 2012; Clacher & Hagendorff,
2012; Mishra & Modi, 2013; Wolf, 2014). This may lead to even greater investor
support even when the company is faced with an ultimatum to act environmentally
responsibly.
Shareholders are financially motivated, but until now it was unknown to what degree
shareholders consider environmental sustainability an asset or a liability (Jensen, 2001;
Rappaport, 1986), and how firm, industry, and institutional characteristics affect
shareholders’ valuation of the firm.
Institutional Theory and Shareholders
Institutional theory provides a basis for studying how external pressures affect
organizational behavior (Doshi, Dowell, & Toffel, 2013). Pressures from external
stakeholders vary depending on the stakeholder group, and there is much overlap in those
pressures. For example, consumers may pressure a firm to provide products that do not
compromise the natural environment. Shareholders may pressure a firm to provide
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maximum returns on investments. But shareholders may also be motivated by
environmental preservation as well, albeit for different reasons than consumers’
environmental motivations.
Shareholders are, by definition, investors in and have a percentage of ownership of a
company through purchasing shares of stock. At the time of stock purchase (investment),
a shareholder is in essence giving a vote of confidence in that company that the
investment will create a return for the shareholder or, at a minimum, the investment will
not be lost through poor management or opportunism. Institutional theory scholars
describe this confidence and granting legitimacy to the organization (e.g., Suchman,
1995).
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Shareholders create an institutional
environment for the organization wherein expectations are largely economic in nature.
Specifically, a return on the shareholder’s investment is the desirable, proper, and
appropriate action.
There are three types of legitimacy an organization can earn: cognitive legitimacy,
moral legitimacy, and pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). All three types of
legitimacy include a generalized perception that an organization’s activities are desirable,
proper, and appropriate within some socially constructed system or norms. For this
research, that socially constructed system or norm is the idea that organizations should be
environmentally sustainable.
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Cognitive legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy means that something is taken for
granted and operates mainly at the subconscious level. In other words, one cannot
articulate exactly why an organization is the best in a certain domain; it just is. Cognitive
legitimacy exists when there is little question in the minds of the different actors that the
organization serves as a natural means to effect some state of being (Hannan and Carroll,
1992). The nature of cognitive legitimacy being abstract makes it difficult for managers
to directly and strategically influence or manipulate perceptions and earn cognitive
legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). However, this form of legitimacy may
disappear if an organization’s practices become seen as unacceptable (Palazzo and
Scherer, 2006). Therefore, cognitive legitimacy may be difficult to attain intentionally,
but certainly maintaining that legitimacy is within the realm of organizational control.
Moral legitimacy. Moral legitimacy connotes a positive normative evaluation of
the firm and the firm’s activities (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). A conscious
evaluation, moral legitimacy is linked to an organization’s outputs as well as its
leadership, organizational structure and procedures (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Society’s
requirements in order to earn moral legitimacy are made known through “explicit public
discussion” (Suchman, 1995, p. 585), which means that organizations can benefit through
actively participating in discussions around what people expect of a green organization.
For example, consumer groups may use social media to voice concerns for a company’s
need to reduce materials in their packaging process. This is a perfect opportunity for that
company to “do the right thing” in order to earn moral legitimacy as a sustainable
organization. Thus, managers may be able to extract approval from society and, in turn,
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earn moral legitimacy, through using deliberate and persuasive strategies to convey an
organization’s sustainability.
The theoretical approach to earning moral legitimacy permits the use of strategy
wherein moral legitimacy can be directly influenced by the actions of the firm (Ashforth
& Gibbs, 1990). Moral legitimacy resides in the “organization’s ability to instrumentally
manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to gain societal support” (Suchman,
1995, p. 572), as opposed to pragmatic legitimacy which is not easily controlled by the
company.
Pragmatic legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is sought from an organization’s most
salient stakeholders, where the organization’s actions visibly affect the stakeholder’s
well-being (Suchman, 1995). Stakeholder salience refers to the relative importance of the
stakeholder to the organization. For example, shareholders are a critical audience to an
organization since they have power to affect the organization. Moreover, shareholders
have a monetary claim in the organization, and the ease with which the relationship
between shareholders and the company can change is great, thereby creating the
possibility for urgent reaction to shareholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). By granting
pragmatic legitimacy, an organization’s stakeholders perceive that they will benefit from
the organization’s actions (Castello & Lozano, 2005). Specifically, if shareholders
perceive that green activities will not inhibit returns, then they may consider the firm
legitimate (see Figure 2, Chapter 2). Therefore, organizations that demonstrate readiness
to comply with a scorecard mandate without affecting shareholders will garner pragmatic
legitimacy.
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Because sustainability is becoming the norm, many firms implement programs with
the hopes that those efforts result in profits to the organization and benefits to the public
and the environment (Orsato, 2006). If successful, shareholders may grant the
organization moral legitimacy toward being a green organization as well as pragmatic
legitimacy in fulfilling the economic expectation of return on investment.

For example,

when companies announce that they have been added to (excluded from) the Dow Jones
Sustainability World Index, Cheung (2011) found that stock prices experience an increase
(decrease). Similarly, Becchett et al. (2012) determined that shareholder value decreased
significantly when companies were deleted from the Domini Index, indicating that
shareholders value social responsibility.
Transaction Cost Economics
Through decades of development and refinement of the Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) concept, we now understand that firms that satisfy stakeholder demands and signal
their willingness to fulfill stakeholder expectations will often avoid high costs of
contracting (e.g., Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, & Paul, 2001; Williamson, 1975,
1985). Unfortunately, different stakeholder demands are often at odds with each other,
and the organization must closely identify how to address each set of demands.
As stakeholder demands emerge, and as the organization attempts to find the
mutually beneficial convergence of firm goals and stakeholder demands, adaptation
issues arise (Heide & John, 1990; John & Weitz, 1989; Stump & Heide, 1996). For
example, if consumers demand environmental sustainability by an organization and
investors demand return on investment, TCE explains the adaptation problem when the
firm must communicate with stakeholders, coordinate activities between each stakeholder
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group, learn new practices, and perhaps renegotiate agreements. Clearly, the more
divergent the stakeholder demands, the higher the cost of adaptation.
Economic stakeholders to an organization are physically limited in their ability to
process information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mahajan, 1992; Simon, 1961; Zajac &
Bazerman, 1991). This limitation is known as “bounded rationality”, a key assumption of
TCE. While shareholders are rational, their decisions are based on somewhat limited
information because managers hold all of the information, but may only share what is
required by law, by the SEC, or other regulating entities. This asymmetry of information
can be critical when faced with environmental mandates (Doh et al., 2010).
This study investigates shareholder perceptions of involuntary environmental
sustainability mandates. The TCE framework suggests that shareholders’ evaluation of
the cost of compliance will be influenced by several key pieces of information in order to
reduce uncertainty about how the firm will perform under the mandate (e.g., Gatignon &
Anderson, 1988; Hu & Chen, 1993; John & Weitz, 1988; Klen, 1989; Levy, 1985; Maltz,
1993).
Mandate performance uncertainty. At a basic level, shareholders’ bounded
rationality means that shareholders lack some knowledge about how the firm will adapt
to a scorecard mandate (Aldrich, 1979). This is a question of monetary cost of
compliance. More specifically, if the firm can easily adapt to the scorecard expectations,
the cost of compliance will be perceived as lower than if the firm would have difficulty
adapting to the mandate (Srinivasan, Mukherjee, & Gaur, 2011).
Uncertainty in the TCE literature is operationalized generally as unpredictability, or
the degree to which the outcome is known. However, the measuring uncertainty depends
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on the context of the study (Pilling, Cosby, & Jackson, 1994). For example, Walker and
Weber (1984) use the following as measures of uncertainty: volume uncertainty is the
inability to accurately forecast volume requirements; technological uncertainty is the
inability to accurately forecast the necessary technological needs; and performance
ambiguity is difficulty in assessing ex post performance in a particular area because past
indication of performance on related area is lacking.
Despite shareholder uncertainty regarding the readiness of a firm to respond to a
scorecard mandate, the vast majority of the research, including meta-analytic results
(Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003) suggests that a positive relationship exists between
environmental sustainability efforts and financial performance (Dixon-Fowler, Slater,
Johnson, Ellstrand, & Romi, 2013). This relationship is the result of a few key
discoveries. First, Orsato (2006) explained how firms reduce costs of environmental
sustainability through creating efficiencies when they eliminate waste. Second, suppliers
that have not met environmental expectations in the supply chain experienced diminished
purchases by firms such as IBM and Body Shop International that have taken steps to
green their supply chain (Wycherley, 1999). Third, commitment to sustainability has
provided access to new markets and customers. For example, General Electric produced
80 new products and services under the Ecomagination program in 2008. This generated
$17 billion in revenue and $100 million in cost savings (Magee, 2009).
Investors’ views of the transaction costs of being environmentally sustainable are
influenced by this information, but shareholders are beginning to understand that
sustainable efforts are not merely a drain on resources and do not generally compromise
profits. This understanding can lead to a positive relationship between environmental
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efforts and firm value (Becchetti et al., 2012). Consequently, there is a general
understanding emerging that shareholder value may be linked to firms’ environmentally
responsible actions (Becchetti et al., 2012; Doh et al., 2010), aside from the costs of
doing so. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: The announcement of a scorecard mandate by the focal firm will be positively
associated with gains in suppliers’ stock returns.
Numerous research agendas have asked the question “Does it pay to be green?”
(see Ambec and Lanoi, 2008 for a review), and while the results support a positive
relationship between environmental sustainability efforts and firm performance, this
research explores when managers can effect an even more positive result. In other words,
what characteristics of the firm and the institutional environment can be used to take
advantage of the green movement? Several firm characteristics and firm/industry
elements will moderate the positive relationship as outlined below.
Transparency
As we move toward reducing the environmental impact of doing business, there is an
expectation that managers be accountable for their actions or inactions (Adams, 2002).
Accountability is “the duty to provide an account of the actions for which an entity is
held responsible” (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, & Zadek, 1997). This definition suggests
that managers disclose environmental impact information, even in the absence of legal
obligations to do so. Unfortunately, the degree to which managers disclose
environmental information, or the degree of transparency between firm environmental
impact and public knowledge, varies dramatically across all businesses and industries.
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In 2009, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) emerged with the support of the
World Resource Initiatives (WRI) and several institutional investors. The CDP collects
information regarding environmental reporting, including disclosure of sources of
environmental risk and liability and actions to minimize firm exposure. This includes a
culmination of company policies and intention to reduce the environmental impact. The
data are intended to give an overall view of how well companies communicate
environmental impact and sustainability efforts to stakeholders (CDP.net).
Transparency, or voluntary disclosure of environmental impact and sustainability
efforts, reduces the uncertainty shareholders may have about the cost of compliance with
a scorecard mandate, and it is critical for aligning shareholder and management interests
(Healy & Palepu, 1999; Hermanson, 2000). Transparency also reduces shareholder
uncertainty as to the readiness of the firm to comply with a scorecard mandate.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H2: The abnormal stock return upon announcement of a scorecard mandate will be
stronger (weaker) for firms with higher (lower) transparency of environmental disclosure.
Dependence
Dependence is a characteristic of buyer-supplier relationships, and exists whenever
neither party has complete control over the relationship and transactions (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Suppliers are dependent on their customers, and buying firms are
dependent upon their suppliers. The greater the asymmetry in the balance of power in the
relationship, the greater the dependence the supplier/customer has on the
customer/supplier. Assumptions that buyer dependence on suppliers and supplier
dependence on buyers is positively associated with supply chain vulnerability have been
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confirmed in the research (Giunipero & Eltantawy, 2004; Hallikas, Puumalainen,
Vesterinen, & Virolainen, 2005; Spekman & Davis, 2004). In other words, if a buying
firm is highly dependent upon a supplier for a particular product, and if the product is not
made available at the time and price needed by the buyer, the buyer will suffer losses
(Bourantas, 1989).
The impact to a supplier faced with a scorecard mandate by a customer depends on
the degree to which the supplier is dependent on that customer for business. Specifically,
if 95% of supplier firm XYZ’s business is with Walmart, then that supplier is extremely
dependent upon and captive to Walmart. Moreover, the supplier who is highly dependent
upon a customer would not have the luxury of disregarding a scorecard mandate and has
little bargaining power as to making concessions for the supplier to work around the
mandate.
Shareholders use information regarding supplier dependence when evaluating the
firm’s ability to adapt to the scorecard mandate. Additionally, the degree to which the
supplier firm must overhaul its operations to comply with the scorecard mandate, and the
costs associated with compliance, will be directly related to the degree of dependence
upon the customer. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: The abnormal stock return upon announcement of a scorecard mandate will be
stronger (weaker) for firms with lower (higher) dependence on the customer making the
mandate.
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Leverage
When firms are not financially able to take on environmental sustainability
initiatives, any investments toward such efforts may be unsustainable over time (Mishra
& Modi, 2013). Furthermore, as shareholders consider the cost of compliance with a
scorecard mandate, they also consider how compliance may affect shareholder returns.
Shareholders watch the financial leverage of a firm when deciding their commitment to
the firm (Titman, 1984), and research suggests that many shareholders are hesitant to
continue to support businesses that are highly leveraged since it affects the firm’s ability
to honor implicit contracts with them (Banerjee, Dasgupta, & Kim, 2008). This occurs
because the use of financial leverage (or going into debt to raise capital) imposes
constraints on managerial options since they are required to service the debt (Jensen,
1986). Therefore, leverage is another important element in analyzing how a socially
responsible action – like complying with an environmental mandate – affects shareholder
wealth (Clacher & Hagendorff, 2012).
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is another, related, construct highly researched
in marketing and many other disciplines. Similar to this research, shareholder wealth is
of great concern since investors are critical to the wellbeing and operations of an
organization. Research has indicated that shareholders appreciate CSR, as indicated by
generally positive stock prices and lower risk when firms incorporate CSR into the
organization (Mishra & Modi, 2013). More specifically, positive CSR reduces firm
idiosyncratic risk to the firm (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), and financial leverage of firms
reduces that upside potential (Mishra & Modi, 2013).
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Consistent with research in finance, leverage of the firm is measured by the ratio of
long-term debt to the market value of its common stock (e.g., Bae, Kang, & Wang, 2011).
Shareholders have this information readily available to them, and can incorporate this
knowledge in deciding whether the firm is financially ready to comply with a scorecard
mandate as well as the potential cost of doing so (Titman, 1984). High leverage equates
to less flexibility with the use of firm money. Thus, the following hypothesis is
proposed:
H4: The abnormal stock returns upon announcement of a scorecard mandate will be
weaker (stronger) for highly (lower) leveraged supplier firms.
Innovativeness
Firms that show a general desire and ability to respond efficiently to market needs
are considered more nimble and “cutting-edge” (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Rust,
Moorman, & Dickson, 2002; Zeithaml, 2000). In fact, marketing managers are under
increasingly greater pressure to justify their actions to management and shareholders
(Lehmann, 2004, Marketing Science Institute, 2004; Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso &
Hanssens, 2009).
Research by Srinisivasan et al., (2009) determined conceptually and empirically that
investors react favorably to companies that launch pioneering innovations through
research and development (R&D) because innovation leads to greater customer
satisfaction (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002; Kashani, Miller, & Clayton, 2000). Especially
relevant to this research, some consumers want the goods they purchase to have
environmentally responsible attributes (product innovation), and/or be produced in an
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environmentally responsible manner (process innovation) (McWilliams and Siegel,
2001).
Beginning with early consideration of the effect of innovation on long-term
corporate health, Drucker (1973) cites innovation and marketing as two key success
factors. Furthermore, several studies show support for innovation as a key to long-term
firm sales and firms’ financial and stock market performance (e.g., Pauwels, Silva-Risso,
Srinivasan, & Hanssens, 2004).
The effect of product innovation on consumer response is well established in the
literature (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2009). However, we must consider how shareholders
perceive the level of innovation as a signal of readiness to comply with a scorecard
mandate. It is expected that for firms that are progressive thinking and innovative,
investors will perceive this as a quality of nimbleness and ability to easily adapt to the
mandate. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H5: The abnormal stock returns upon announcement of a scorecard mandate will be
stronger (weaker) for supplier firms high (low) in innovation.
Industry Environmental Impact
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified six sectors in order to
determine how organizations within particular industries should be addressed insofar as
environmental impact is concerned. Since it has been established that companies that
operate within high environmental impact industries, for example, will be subject to a
different set of regulations and policies than a company that operates in a low
environmental impact industry. Thus, it stands to reason that the industry’s
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environmental impact as a whole will influence how shareholders perceive an
organization’s ability to adapt to and comply with the scorecard mandate.
Organizations that are in a high environmental impact (HEI) industry will
undoubtedly be aware of the need for environmental sustainability efforts since it more
highly regulated (Hoffman, 1999; Ochsner, 1998), and may even have elements of the
scorecard in place prior to the mandate. Thus, since firms an a HEI industry may already
be in compliance with governmental regulations surrounding environmental issues, it
may be more easily adaptable to the scorecard mandate requirements than firms in a
moderate environmental impact (MEI) industry. Shareholders undoubtedly incorporate
this knowledge into a valuation decision following the scorecard mandate.
Industry type is measured through a dichotomization of industry types into HEIs and
MEIs based on previous research (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2003). Pharmaceuticals, utilities,
manufacturing, and chemicals are considered HEIs; and services, consumer products and
foods are considered MEIs. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H6: The abnormal stock returns upon announcement of a scorecard mandate stronger
(weaker) for supplier firms with a high (low) environmental impact.
Firm Size
Similar to research in corporate social responsibility (CSR), it is expected that a
scorecard mandate is positively related to stock price, and both CSR and environmental
efforts involve evaluation of the firm’s societal relationships (Wood, 1991) and firm size
(Price & Mueller, 1986). Specifically, research on these relationships indicates that
larger firms are more visible in society and, therefore, engage in more socially motivated
activities (Chen & Metcalf, 1980), such as environmental sustainability, than smaller, less
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visible firms. Moreover, larger firms experience greater demand to communicate those
activities and the motivation behind them (Roberts, 1992), which gives shareholders
more knowledge on which to base their perceptions of the firm’s readiness and ability to
comply with an environmental mandate.
Since larger firms attract the attention from more stakeholders who place pressure on
the firm to act socially responsible, larger firms may feel more pressure to respond to
those demands (Waddock & Graves, 1997) than smaller firms. Furthermore, smaller
firms tend to be more constrained in resources and, thus, must dedicate resources to more
economic requirements of the firm (Aupperle, Simmons, & Acar, 1990; Pinkston &
Carroll, 1993).
The assumption in this research involves the impact of visibility of the firm. We are
not assuming that larger firms perform better following environmental sustainability
efforts. This distinction comes from ample research that has shown that both large and
small firms can benefit from socially- responsible activities (e.g., Orlitzky, 2001). Since
firm size in this research is considered a non-economic influence, firm size is measured
as the number of employees at the time the announcement is made. Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H7: The abnormal stock returns upon announcement of a scorecard mandate will be
stronger (weaker) for large (small) supplier firms.
Controls
In keeping with prior event study research, additional market- and firm-specific
factors warrant inclusion as controls. These controls are important because shareholder
perceptions of the firm’s ability to comply with the scorecard mandate will depend on the
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information that shareholders possess. Market share is the firm’s sales revenue divided
by total industry sales, and market share can be influential because a firm with greater
market share can be more efficient in creating future cash flow from its market-based
assets (Gruca & Rego, 2005). Firm return on assets is a firm’s ability to generate high
operating returns relative to its assets (Zou & Cavusgil, 2002). Industry concentration, or
how much the top four firms account for overall industry sales, can affect how suppliers
influence buyers. In a concentrated market, very few suppliers contribute to the
overwhelming majority of overall sales. Therefore, those suppliers have power to comply
or perhaps band together to reject the mandate altogether. Barriers to entry in a
concentrated industry insulate existing firms from taking certain risks (Hou & Robinson,
2006). Market-to-book value ratios can affect investor perceptions of firms (Luo &
Bhattacharya, 2009). Firms in good financial condition to comply with the scorecard
mandate will be able to demonstrate that compliance is sustainable over time (Mishra &
Modi, 2013). Market capitalization is included as another indicator of firm financial
stability since it is the value of all outstanding shares of stock. Finally, the age of the
firm since it was included on the CRSP database as a publically traded stock was
included to control for any influence on the relationship between shareholder perceptions
of the firm and the announcement of a scorecard mandate. Dummy variables were
included to control for the date of the announcements and for the focal firms making the
scorecard mandate on the suppliers.
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Methodology
Data Collection
To analyze the relationship between an environmental sustainability mandate and
abnormal stock returns, we compiled a list of 10 publically traded companies (the focal
firms) that implemented a supplier sustainability scorecard between 2007 and 2011.
Next, we compiled the announcements from the 10 focal companies, and identified the
date of each announcement. Finally, suppliers to the focal firms were identified from
FactSet Supply Chain Relationships (formerly Revere Analytics, LLC). Initially, the
supplier list was in excess of 1,500 firms.
Confounding events were then identified through a LexisNexis or Factiva search for
each supplier that occurred within 20 days of the announcement date (McWilliams &
Siegel, 1997). Any supplier firm with confounding events in this respective window was
eliminated from the sample. Possible confounding events include all stock splits and
structural stock changes, lawsuits, product recalls, dividends, governance changes,
mergers and acquisitions, changes in leadership, earnings announcements, or
bankruptcies.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the firm’s abnormal stock returns calculated
by the market model with data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The market model is an estimation of all daily returns for the stock market during a 250trading-day period ending 15 days before the event date(s). Our study relies on an event
study approach of the OLS-market model proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). They
suggest that the event study is effective to measure stock price reactions to
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announcements of firm's specific information in financial management. For the event
study, it is assumed that a security market is efficient as to dissemination of new
information, so that firm valuation to any information disclosure can be evaluated by a
change in abnormal stock returns very quickly. The abnormal return of individual stock i
from the OLS-market model, which means creation in firm value to the event
announcement, is measured as follows:
E(Rit) = αi + βiRmt + εit
where E(Rit ) denotes the expected daily returns for firm i on day t if the event had
not taken place, Rmt denotes the daily returns of the respective market index, αi and βi
are firm-specific parameters, and εit is the normally distributed error term (Brown &
Warner, 1985).
We used estimates from this model to predict the daily abnormal returns for each for
all event days, ARit. Here, Rit signifies the actual daily returns, and E(Rit) represents the
model estimates. ARit gives an unbiased estimate of the future earnings generated by the
event and is a random variable with a zero mean (Fama, 1970; Gielens, Van de Gucht,
Steenkamp, & Dekimpe, 2008).
ARit = Rit – E(Rit) = Rit - (αi + βiRmt + εit)
Next, we determined an appropriate event window [t1, t2] that is long enough to
ensure the dissemination of information regarding the scorecard mandate announcement.
Thus, we calculated abnormal returns for alternative event periods, each ranging from t1
to t2 to CARi [-t1, t2]:

CAR[-t1, t2] =

t2

å ARit

t=-t1
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Assuming that the announcement information is efficiently processed, “an event
window should be as short as possible”(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997, p. 636), in order to
include only the specific trading day of the announcement. However, it is usually the
case that information has been leaked to the market the day before the specific event day
(MacKinlay, 1997), therefore, the day before the press announcement is usually of
interest as well as the event day. To address this issue, the general practice is to expand
the event window to the day before and the day after the announcement day (Agarwal &
Kamakura, 1995; Brown & Warner, 1985; Wiles & Danielova, 2009). The results of the
analysis on event windows are shown in Table 7 below (window chosen for this study is
in bold).
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Table 7
Event Study Outcome
Event
Observations
Day
-7
778
-6
778
-5
778
-4
778
-3
778
-2
778
-1
778
0
778
1
778
2
777
3
777
4
777
5
777
6
777
7
777
CAAR [-t1, t2]
Event
M
Window
- 3 to 0
0.12%
- 2 to + 2 0.14%
- 1 to + 2 0.18%
- 1 to + 3 0.26%
0 to + 1 0.15%
0 to + 2 0.08%
- 1 to + 1 0.25%

M

t-value z-value

0.02%
-0.01%
-0.08%
-0.03%
0.02%
-0.04%
0.10%
0.05%
0.10%
-0.07%
0.08%
-0.09%
0.03%
0.09%
0.06%

0.21
-0.08
-0.90
-0.27
0.20
-0.49
1.08
0.50
1.16
-0.81
0.79
-0.95
0.31
0.86
0.50

-0.12
-0.04
-0.76
0.18
0.25
0.08
1.11
0.81
0.97
-0.92
0.94
-0.90
0.17
0.00
1.90

t-value z-value
0.70
0.66
0.99
1.22
1.23
0.49
1.62

1.12
0.91
0.98
1.30
1.26
0.49
1.66

In order to validate the event window empirically, established procedures were
followed (Agarwal & Kamakura, 1995; Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002). This
process includes calculating the cumulative average abnormal returns of the firms in our
sample (N) for various event windows (CAARi)(t1 = seven days before the
announcement, and t2 = seven days after the announcement) and tested the significance of
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these various event windows using the t-test of Brown and Warner (1985) and the
generalized sign z-test (Cowan, 1992):
n

CAAR[t1, t2] = åCARi[t1, t2] / n
i=1

To test hypotheses, we standardized the cumulative abnormal returns (SCARi) using
the standard deviation of abnormal returns over the estimation window to correct for the
firm’s differences in variances in the daily closing prices (Aktas, Bodt, & Cousin, 2007;
Gielens et al., 2008; Raassens, Wuyts, & Geyskens, 2012).
Independent Variables
Information about the firm- and market-related moderators and control variables
were obtained through Compustat for the variables included in the environmental
sustainability mandate model. The variables of interest are transparency, dependency,
leverage, R&D intensity, environmental impact, and firm size.
The transparency of the supplier firms is a measure from zero to 100 (zero is the
lowest possible rating) the year prior to the event. This rating of transparency has been
used in numerous research studies, and is understood to capture the degree to which a
firm communicates its environmental impact and sustainability efforts to stakeholders, is
considered critical for aligning shareholder and management interests (e.g., Dawkins &
Fraas, 2011). Supplier firm dependence upon the focal firm is calculated as the
percentage of business with the focal firm. Leverage is measured by total long-term debt
divided by total assets (Bae et al., 2011) one year prior to the event. R&D intensity, or
total R&D expense the year before the event divided by total sales the year before the
event, are a proxy for level of innovativeness by the firm. Existing literature on
environmental management shows that the role that green issues play in management is
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highly industry-specific (Banerjee et al., 2003; Russo & Fouts, 1997). Moreover,
environmental innovation occurs much more in some industries than in others (Jaffe &
Palmer, 1997 ; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996), because industries differ dramatically in the
level of pollution that is caused by the industry and the level of public concern an
industry evokes (Banerjee et al., 2003). Therefore, the environmental impact of the
industry is another important construct in understanding the effect of a scorecard mandate
on shareholder wealth. Industry environmental impact is zero for high environmental
impact firms, and 1 for moderate environmental impact firms others (Jaffe & Palmer,
1997 ; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996). Finally, firm size is calculated as the natural log of
number of employees the year of the event.
Controls
We computed the firm’s market share as the firm’s sales relative to industry sales.
Industry sales were captured as the cumulative sales at the firm’s two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code level (Tuli, Bharadwaj, & Kohli, 2010). We
measured industry concentration as the ratio of the top four firms (in sales) to total
industry sales (Tuli et al., 2010). Firm return on assets (ROA) is the firm’s net income
divided by total assets the year prior to the event (Rego, Billet, & Morgan, 2009). Finally,
the market-to-book ratio is included as a control since it can affect investor perceptions of
firms (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2009). Table 8 shows descriptive statistics and correlations
of the variables.
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean

Std.
Dev.

1

Abnormal
Return (CAAR)

0.01

4.22

1

2

Ind. Conc.

38.80

19.21

0.00

1

3

Mkt. Share

3.29

7.36

-0.05

0.55***

1

4

Mkt. to book

4.29

8.36

-0.08

-0.00

0.08

1

5

Firm Age

9.95

4.95

0.17**

-0.14*

-0.12*

0.05

1

6

Total Assets

6.99

2.07

0.07

0.11

0.39***

0.16**

0.14*

1

7

Transp.

53.05

13.32

0.48***

0.17**

0.17**

0.08

0.01

0.29***

1

8

Lev.

72.35

102.11

-0.12**

0.11

-0.04

0.32***

0.12*

0.23**

0.18**

1

9

Dep.

16.72

5.95

0.11

0.03

-0.03

0.10

-0.00

0.04

0.08

0.05

1

10

R&D Int.

2.14

5.61

-0.05

-0.13

-0.06

-0.03

-0.03

-0.10

-0.20

-0.17**

-0.07

1

11

Env. Impact

0.47

0.50

-0.00

0.52***

0.32**

-0.06

-0.08

-0.09

-0.03

-0.06

-0.11*

0.13*

1

12

Firm Size

16.58

31.11

-0.00

-0.04

0.26***

0.08

0.14**

0.66***

0.15**

0.04

-0.04

-0.08

-0.17**

1

2

3

4

*Sig. at 10%
**Sig. at 5%
***Sig. at 1%
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5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1

Results of Event Study: Do Environmental Sustainability Mandates Influence
Abnormal Returns?
We first examine the overall CAR for the portfolio of firms included in the
announcement dates. In addition to the mean CAR, we provide four commonly reported
statistics for event studies: the positive to negative CAR ratio, the standardized residual
test statistic (Patell, 1976), the standardized cross-sectional test statistic (Boehmer,
Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991), and the generalized sign test statistic (Cowan, 1992) (see
Table 9).

Table 9
Announcement Effect on Stock Price
Mean
Pos:Neg CAR
CAR
Ratio
Window
-1, 0
0.15%
402:376*

Patell's
Z

Std Cross
Sectional t-test

Generalized
sign test

1.16*

0.60

2.10*

-1, 1

0.25%

410:368*

1.62*

0.82

2.68*

0, 1

0.15%*

401:377*

1.23*

0.59

2.03*

*p < .05

Abnormal returns for the 15 days around the event confirm that the day before and
after the announcement and the event day show significant stock market reactions.
Consistent with event study methodology, we chose the event window with the most
significant t-test and z-test statistic (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997): the event day and the
day before the announcement CARi[-1,1]. For this window from t1 = -1 to t2 = 1, the
announcement that suppliers are subject to a supplier sustainability scorecard mandate on
average indicates positive abnormal stock returns of 25% (p < .05), in support of H1.
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Announcement of a scorecard mandate on suppliers has a positive effect on cumulative
average stock price.
How Do Other Factors Influence the Value Creation of Environmental
Mandates?
The effects that other firm- and industry-related characteristics have on the abnormal
returns following announcement of a scorecard mandate may remain noticed if analysis
ended with reporting only the abnormal returns. A total of 14 firm- and industry-related
characteristics were discussed, and ordinary least squares regression is used to determine
how those characteristics influence the abnormal returns based on the following:

CARi = b0 + b1 (Transparency)+ b2 (Leverage)+ b3 (Dependence)+
b4 (R & DIntensity)+ b5 (EnvIm pact)+ b6 (FirmSize)+ b7 (Concentration)+ b8 (MarketShare)+

b9 (MktToBook)+ b10 (ROA)+ b11 (FirmAge)+ b12 (TotalAssets)+ b13 (YearDummies)
+b14 (FocalFirmDummies)+ e
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal stock return for event i over the event
window; TRANSPARENCYi is 0 to 100 score based on CDP rating; LEVERAGEi is the
ratio of long-term debt to assets; DEPENDENCEi is the percentage of business with
customer (focal firm); R&Di is ratio of R&D expense to sales; IMPACTi is 0 when high
environmental impact industry and 1 when moderate environmental impact; SIZEi is the
supplier firm size measured by number of employees; CONCENTRATIONi is the ratio
of the top four firms in sales in the industry to total industry sales; MKTSHAREi is the
ratio of firm sales to industry sales; ROAi is the ratio of net income to total assets; and
MKTBOOKi is the ratio of market price to book price for the supplier firm; and
FIRMAGEi is measured by the years the firm has been publically traded up until one
year prior to the announcement of the mandate.
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Data
The data used in the analysis were entirely secondary, and all data for the variables
in the regression model were compiled through the Compustat database. Compustat is
considered to provide dependable and reliable data, and is used extensively in many
disciplines as a source of secondary data.
The relationship between an environmental sustainability mandate and stock price
may be dynamic in that the announcement affects stock price, and may be affected by it
(McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). Thus, it is necessary to control for the
potential endogeneity between the mandate announcement and stock price (GarciaCastro, Arino, & Canela, 2010). Therefore, each of the variables was measured and
calculated the year prior to the event year for the respective suppliers, which allows for
lagged effects of the independent variables on the scorecard mandate announcement.
Results of Cross-Sectional Regression: What Drives the Positive CARs?
For the drivers of the positive abnormal stock return, we ran a cross-sectional
regression on the model above. First, we examined the correlation matrix across the
variables (see Table 8) to determine relationships between variables. Multicollinearity
was assessed in SPSS, and did not appear to be an issue since all variance inflation factor
(VIF) values were under three for the main variable (Mason & Perreault, 1991), and all of
the variables show low overall estimates. The means and standard deviations are also
shown in Table 8.
Table 10 provides the results of two regression models to test the hypotheses. The
first model includes the control variables only. The full model indicates a significantly
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greater R2, which indicates that it represents data better than the control only model (ΔR2
= 0.248, p < .001).

Table 10
Estimation Results for Scorecard Mandate
Dependent Variable:
Abnormal Stock
Returnsa
Controls Only
Estimate
Std. Err
Intercept
-2.18
1.89
Firm Characteristics
Transparency
Leverage
Dependence
R&D Intensity
Environmental Impact
Firm Size
Industry Concentration
Market Share
Market-to-Book
Firm Age
Total Assets
Year Dummies
Focal Firm Dummies
Observations
R-square
F
*p < .05
**p < .001
a
Event window: [-1,1]

0.01
-0.03
-0.06
0.14*
0.10
Included
Included
138
.13
1.25

0.02
0.07
0.05
0.08
0.21

Full Model
Estimate
Std. Err
-11.14
2.43
0.17*
-0.01
0.05
0.00
0.59
-0.01

0.03
0.00
0.06
0.07
0.82
0.01

-0.01
-0.08
-0.03
0.16
0.12
Included
Included
138
.38
3.36**

0.02
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.24

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the level of transparency of the firm with regard to
environmental efforts and impact would be positively related to stock price following the
announcement of a scorecard mandate. Specifically, H2 states that the greater the level
of transparency, the greater the abnormal stock return on the event day. Regression
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results indicate that transparency has a statistically significant effect on market value (β =
0.167, p < .05), in support of H2. Similarly, leverage was predicted to have a negative
relationship with abnormal stock price following the mandate announcement, and the
regression results support this as well (β = -0.01, p < .05). The more leveraged a firm
when a focal firm implements a scorecard mandate, the weaker the positive abnormal
stock return, in support of H3.
With respect to the remaining predictions, we must reject the remaining hypotheses.
Although all of the resulting beta estimates were in the predicted direction, none of the
remaining hypotheses were significant. Specifically, H4 predicted that firms that have a
greater percentage of their sales to the focal firm would experience a significantly weaker
positive abnormal return. The result is indicative of this effect, but is not significant (β =
0.052, n.s.). Next, we hypothesized that firms that commit a greater percentage of their
sales to research and development would experience a stronger positive abnormal stock
price following the announcement of a scorecard mandate. Results indicate that this is
not the case (β = 0.01, n.s.). Hypothesis 6 predicted that firms that operate in industries
known to have a high environmental impact on the environment would experience a
stronger positive abnormal return than firms in moderate environmental impact
industries. High environmental impact firms do experience stronger positive abnormal
returns following the mandate, but the result is not significant (β = 0.586, n.s). Finally,
firm size was predicted in H7 to be negatively associated with abnormal stock price
following the mandate announcement. Although this variable is directionally in line with
our predictions, the result is not significant (β = -0.011, n.s.).
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Regarding the value creation following an environmental mandate, the coefficients
of the controls are significant for firm age (β = 0.14, p < .05). All other controls had the
expected effect on stock price, but the results were non-significant.
Summary of Results
The last section described the data analysis techniques used in this study and the
results of the data analysis for the hypothesis testing were presented. Table 11 is a
summary of the hypotheses and the results of the hypothesis testing completed in the last
section.

Table 11
Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Hyp.

Independent
Variable(s)

Dependent
Variable

Supported

H1

Mandate
Announcement
(Event)

Positive
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return (CAR)

Yes

H2

Transparency

CAR

Yes

H3

Dependence

CAR

H4

Leverage

CAR

H5

Innovativeness

CAR

Not significant, but in
hypoth. direction

H6

Industry
Environmental
Impact

CAR

Not significant, but in
hypoth. direction

H7

Firm Size

Not significant, but in
hypoth. direction
Yes

Not significant, but in
hypoth. direction

CAR
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The main objective of this study was to understand the relationship between
involuntary mandates and shareholder reactions. Specifically, we were interested in what
information or knowledge would enhance shareholder’s perceptions of the firm’s
readiness to comply with a mandate. Prior research has not focused on involuntary
decisions for environmental sustainability, and has revealed mostly positive effects of
those voluntary efforts that have been researched.
Implications for Practitioners
This research provides insights to practitioners who may potentially face involuntary
environmental mandates. Mandates made by governments, non-governmental entities,
and other organizations are a growing part of moving toward environmental
sustainability, and firms must be prepared to respond to and comply with a variety of
mandates so as not to degrade shareholder support of the firm. Findings from this study
inform managers regarding the characteristics that are necessary in preparation for
environmental sustainability mandates.
First, we confirmed prior studies’ suggestions that environmental sustainability
efforts are perceived positively by shareholders, as reflected in abnormally high stock
price that was cumulative across firms that were subject to an environmental mandate.
This means that shareholders quickly assimilate the announcement of the mandate into
their assumptions for future earnings with the firm that is subject to the mandate, and
perceive it as a good thing.
Building upon the positive effect of the environmental mandate on share price, we
confirmed the prediction that information in the way of increased transparency lowers

101

information asymmetry between shareholder and management. The more transparent a
firm is with regard to environmental sustainability efforts and impact, the more positively
shareholders perceive the environmental mandate. In other words, shareholders know
with more certainty how prepared the firm is to comply with the mandate, and are able to
assess the potential costs of doing so.
Furthermore, this study reveals that the financial health of the firm is an important
factor in shareholder reaction to an involuntary mandate. More specifically, firms that
have less financial flexibility (greater debt) signal to the shareholder that compliance with
the mandate will be more difficult and perhaps more costly than for firms that have less
debt. This finding is significant because it highlights a boundary condition that is highly
relevant to and somewhat controllable by managers.
Transparency and leverage are just two of the important elements managers need
to consider when preparing for future environmental mandates. All of the predictions in
this study were in the hypothesized direction. Despite the fact that the effects of other
elements were not significant, managers would be well served to consider how these
elements contribute to a positive shareholder reaction.
Limitations of the Research
Although our analysis has confirmed a number of our hypotheses, there are some
issues that need to be reflected on in interpreting our results given the analysis that we
have undertaken. Specifically, the robustness of the results is directly dependent on the
reliability of secondary data sources for screening out firms with potential confounding
events.
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Additionally, we are unsure whether the focal firms informed any of their
suppliers prior to announcement of the scorecard mandate. Therefore, it is unclear
whether our results would differ if we had that information.
Finally, there is some duplication in terms of suppliers who were involved in more
than one event (a supplier to Walmart who experienced the event in 2007 may also be a
supplier to Target and experienced the event in 2009). These are issues that will be
considered and expanded upon in future related research.
Future Research Directions
In this research, some of the firms supply multiple focal firms. With the
increasing prevalence of supplier sustainability scorecards, some of these supplier firms
have been subject to the scorecard mandate by multiple focal firms. Future research can
1) eliminate redundancy if it appears that there is a positive trend over time, and 2) we
can measure just how much more/less the firm value is effected with multiple scorecard
mandates. We see this as an opportunity to dive deeper into how supplier firms benefit or
suffer from multiple mandates and, specifically, what firm characteristics influence the
effect.
Despite some limitations, there is considerable opportunity for future research on the
topic of mandates. For example, environmental mandates may have different effects
when they come from a regulating body in comparison to a supply chain
member/customer. Further, future research would investigate the disclosure reports of
highly transparent versus less transparent firms to determine to what, exactly,
shareholders react. In other words, what, specifically, is a “high quality transparency
firm”?
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Another direction for research is to consider the focal firms and what characteristics
or economic conditions are necessary in order to complete an environmental mandate.
Since the number of focal firms in this research was small, we were unable to investigate
these questions to any level of significance.
Research possibilities with regard to environmental sustainability and stakeholders
are virtually endless. These are just a few directions that are planned in the near future to
bolster our understanding of how environmental mandates affect shareholder wealth.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research was to enhance theoretical and empirical knowledge as
to how green organizational behaviors are perceived by two key stakeholder groups,
consumers and shareholders, and how those stakeholders’ perceptions may or may not
validate the firms’ green actions. This research contributes to existing marketing
knowledge about institutional change toward organizational greenness through two
pioneering studies that examine consumers’ and shareholders’ reactions to green
strategies. Academic literature has explored the concept of organizational greenness, but
has not yet fully applied a theoretical basis to how firms change to become green
institutions.
The study of institutions is the study of norm-governed behavior (Holm, 1995). This
research, building on institutional theory, considers how organizations go green given
their current institutional environments. According to institutional theory scholars,
legitimacy is broadly defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is considered a
resource (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995) in the way of reputational capital
(Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Hart, 1995). Additionally, legitimacy is a state of being
granted to an organization by groups or individuals external to it (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). In other words, when a firm conforms to stakeholders’ institutional expectations,
the firm earns legitimacy.

105

A conceptual model was developed (see Chapter 2, Figure 2) to depict the interplay
between the stakeholder-firm relationship, the institutional environment in which the firm
must act, stakeholder evaluation of firm activities, and the resulting legitimacy following
stakeholder evaluation of firm activities. Although the institutional environment in which
the firm operates varies depending on the stakeholder group of interest, overlap of
environments means that evaluations may vary as well. For example, although
shareholders are primarily economically motivated, they may have concern for how firms
address sustainability. Therefore, there is an overlap in the institutional environments of
the investor that the firm can utilize since the shareholder will evaluate the firm not only
from an economic standpoint, but also from an ethical standpoint.
Using the model of stakeholder legitimacy, this research demonstrates how different
stakeholder groups confer legitimacy to the organization differently. Although many
studies in marketing and management consider organizational efforts as a way of
obtaining legitimacy as outlined by institutional theory (e.g., Doh et al., 2010), none of
the studies take into account different stakeholder needs and expectations and the
conditions for conferring legitimacy. Instead, existing research in institutional theory and
legitimacy focus on normative processes, and focus mostly on the organization, rather
than the stakeholder.
Normative legitimacy has been explored at length, and, among other insights, offers
an understanding of the moral expectations of stakeholders. Shareholders have moral
expectations, but this study considers the role of shareholders’ practical expectations
when considering shareholder reactions to a potentially costly mandate. Fulfilling
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practical expectations leads to shareholder’s granting the firm pragmatic legitimacy.
These expectations include providing information and knowledge to shareholders.
To gain a richer understanding of how organizational greening efforts affect
shareholders, this research moved beyond normative legitimacy and moral explanations
to how shareholders grant a different kind of legitimacy to the organization: pragmatic
legitimacy. These significant results provide important direction for firms in an
increasingly regulated area with respect to environmental sustainability.
Managers who are responsible for making strategic decisions about organizational
greening practices will benefit from this research in that there can be no “one size fits all”
strategy. In other words, the dynamic nature of institutional environments in which firms
operate dictates how managers green their organizations.
Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidl (2013) summarized prior research on two primary
approaches to earning legitimacy; strategic manipulation, and adaptation. Our research
supports a combination of these strategies to create a hybrid approach to earning
legitimacy in organizational greening.
A manipulation strategy approach responds to social expectations by attempting to
change perceptions of key stakeholders or actors (Barley, 2010; Child & Rodrigues 2011;
Oliver 1991). By manipulation, we mean the “active attempt to alter the content of
institutional requirements and influence their promoters” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 463).
This involves, for example, influencing consumers through advertising and other
impression management techniques. Naturally, a manipulation strategy is risky in that
stakeholders may criticize the actual efforts of the firm (Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz,
2011). This strategy does not suggest falsifying information (e.g., Enron), but rather a
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manipulation strategy merely uses particular outlets to communicate or signal the firm’s
greenness in the best light possible regardless of the depth of effort. The first paper in
this dissertation is an example of the effectiveness of a manipulation strategy.
Legitimacy was earned even when the firm performed minimally in actual organizational
greening activities.
Alternatively, organizational greening can occur through an adaptation strategy.
Institutional theory states that practices must actually satisfy social expectations (Bansal
et al., 2005; Delmas, 2002; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Schafer 2007). This strategy
involves development of actual green processes and procedures. The cost involved with
an adaptation strategy is potentially very high, but this strategy should be weighed against
a manipulation strategy based not only on cost, but also on concerns of the most
important stakeholders (Scherer et al., 2013).
The second paper in this dissertation demonstrated how shareholders respond to
firms in which they are invested when the firms must adapt to genuine organizational
greening practices. Depending on how well the firm is poised to respond to an
environmental mandate (e.g., degree of financial leverage), shareholders perceive the cost
of an adaptation to be green as a cost to shareholders’ future returns. An adaptation
strategy would best suit a situation where the firm has financial flexibility to implement
organizational greening efforts, and, thus, shareholders would evaluate the efforts more
positively than if the firm were highly leveraged.
A hybrid strategy involves managerial assessment of 1) external expectations and 2)
the cost of organizational change (Smith & Lewis, 2011). This approach incorporates
both manipulation and adaptation simultaneously to respond appropriately to stakeholder
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expectations (Lewis, 2000) depending on the organization’s institutional environments
and available resources.
Preparing to use a hybrid strategy is challenging in that it requires flexibility to not
only establish internal structures or groups that are prepared and empowered to respond
and take either a manipulation or adaptation strategy depending upon the stakeholder and
institutional environments, but managers must also be prepared to evaluate situations
contextually and act or delegate accordingly (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010).
An example of an internal structure would be an environmental team that would
monitor the media for new developments or activist groups that may bring the
organization into the spotlight. Ideally, this group might recommend an adaptation
strategy to create a green program if the context of the media content is potentially
threatening enough that the cost to implement an adaptation strategy would be warranted.
Alternatively, if the group determined that an appropriate approach would involve a
manipulation strategy, the group would work with the advertising group, for example, to
create a relevant communications about the firm’s sustainability.
According to the literature, a firm typically responds universally to the need for
legitimacy from stakeholders (Scherer et al., 2013). We argue for and this research
supports the need for a hybrid strategic approach, enabling a firm to either choose
between different strategies or implement multiple strategies simultaneously. This allows
managers to choose a suitable approach depending upon the need for and type of
legitimacy, the stakeholder group of concern, and the ability of the organization to
respond from a resource perspective.
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